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FILE No.

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ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
British Interests Section
BAGHDAD

| |
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| RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 17 JUL 1973 NBR 1/2 |
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G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date 9 July 1973

*Mr. Smith to Secy
16/2*

Dear Graham,

IRAQ - INTERNAL

1. It was announced at 1.15 am this morning that the special court set up to try the Nadhim Kzar clique had sentenced to death a further fourteen. One of these, the most senior one involved, Khaliq as-Samaraie has had his sentence commuted to life imprisonment. (Presumably the RCC do not feel strong enough, even now, to execute him). The text of the announcement is enclosed.

2. Earlier in the evening an official account of the coup attempt was released. This was presumably the result of the enquiries of the investigating committee. A copy of this is also enclosed (though it has not yet been published in English). There is no reason to doubt the basic details of this report.

3. The most important remaining question is whether the Army were at any stage party to the plot. Saadoun Ghaidan's request to go to Britain and Shihab's sons prompt return to Sandhurst suggest that no great suspicion attaches to the military leadership. Saddam Hussein has stated that "no elements of the armed forces participated in the commission of the crime". (Baghdad Observer 7 July). Though I at first thought that this meant the opposite, the freedom now accorded to Saadoun Ghaidan makes it more likely to be true.

*Yours ever
Ian.*

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Translation from Al Jumhuriyah of 9 July 1973

An official spokesman made the following statement concerning the incident in which Nadhim Ksar and his clique were involved.

From the course of investigations, it was learnt on Wednesday 4 July 1973 that Muhammad Fadhil, Member of the Regional Command, had learnt from Nadhim Ksar personally at 5 p.m. on Saturday, 30 June, about the operation of the invitation extended to the two Ministers and their interment which was carried out by Nadhim Ksar.

From the course of investigations also it was learnt that Muhammad Fadhil had reported this fact to Abdul Khaliq al Samarraie, member of the Nationalist and Regional Commands of the Party at 6.30 the same evening at Baghdad International Airport when together with other responsible men they were there to receive the President of the Republic ^{on his return} from his official visits to Bulgaria and Poland. Both Muhammad Fadhil and Abdul Khaliq al Samarraie did not inform the Regional Command of the grave information in spite of the fact that members of the Nationalist and Regional Commands were present at that time at the Airport as also was the Vice-President of the Revolutionary Command Council. Similarly, they gave no information whatever that they were aware of the incident during the following days during which they were exercising their responsibilities in their capacity as members of the Command and attending the meetings devoted to discussing the details of the incident and those which took part in it.

When the Regional Command learnt of this grave development, they summoned Muhammad Fadhil and Abdul Khaliq al Samarraie

and confronted them with the facts. Muhammad Fadhil admitted the fact that he was aware of the criminal incident and that he had informed Abdul Khaliq al Samarraie about it, whereas Abdul Khaliq al Samarraie denied that he was aware of it.

In view of that, the Nationalist and Regional Commands and the R.C.C. decided to deprive them of their party and official responsibilities and to refer them to the Special Investigating Committee for defining their responsibilities in full and the punishment which they deserve.

The official spokesman also announced that the criminal plot aimed at the life of the President of the Republic and the Vice-President of the R.C.C. since Nadhim Khar had entrusted some of his clique to assassinate them during the official reception ceremonies at the Airport. The official spokesman said that Nadhim Khar was able to invite Hammad Shihab and Sadun Ghaidan and other responsible men to meet him for two considerations, firstly because he held a prominent post in the State which enabled him to contact and meet senior responsible officials, and secondly because he held an a party position higher than the other comrades which he invited to meet him. At the same time Nadhim Khar cheated Hammad Shihab and Sadun Ghaidan by convincing them his desire to keep them acquainted with something connected with the competence of the two Ministers. Nadhim Khar had succeeded in inviting all those whom he invited during the day. At about 6 p.m. and when he had met Muhammad Fadhil and a number of members of the clique in the Headquarters of the Second Investigating Committee, which was one of the security officers directly attached to him, Nadhim Khar left the Headquarters of the Committee for the Directorate General of Security and thence to the place where he had detained the Ministers of the Interior and Defence and other responsible officials. He took with him arms and money and remained there until 9 p.m. awaiting the execution of the second part of his plot at the Airport. However, the strong guards which existed at the Airport prevented the plot being carried out.

The clique which Nadhim Khar had entrusted the role of assassinating the President of the Republic and Vice-President of the R.C.C. left the Airport after 6 p.m. having felt that men of the Intelligence Department were watching the Airport carefully, and that the time of arrival had been postponed for

reasons not known by them. The clique were scared and left the Airport since they imagined that the plot had been discovered and was the reason for the late arrival of the plane carrying the President which was due to arrive at Baghdad at 6 p.m. The plane actually arrived late due to the continued discussions carried out between the President of Iraq and the President of Poland in the morning of Saturday, 30 June, and the signing of a number of agreements in the presence of the two Presidents.

Another delay took place in the Summer Resort of Varna at Bulgaria where the plane of the President had land for fueling because the Bulgarian Government gave an official reception to the President of Iraq which lasted for 1 hour and 15 minutes.

Nadhim Khar and his clique were awaiting at the place wherein they had detained the Ministers of the Interior and Defense the execution of the second phase of their plot by watching the T.V. which was showing the reception. Upon the arrival of the

President of the Republic and when the reception took its normal shape and when the President had left the Airport together with the Vice-President of the R.G.C. peacefully, Nadhim Khar realised that his plot has failed so he suffered a hysteric state and placed all the hostages in motor cars and ran away towards Kerbala. Before doing so, he wired through a wireless set of an Emergency Police car which he had laid hand on to the Nationalist Command. In this wire, he threatened to assassinate the hostages unless his demands now contained in his wire are implemented. His demands were to send the Iraqi Army to the Palestinian field, to wage a war against the Kurds and to expel a number of responsible men from the Party and the State. In that telegram he asked that negotiations on his conditions be carried out in the house of Abdul Haliq al Samarraie without defining any details concerning that. Nadhim Khar actually sent no person for this purpose.

Members of the Nationalist and Regional Commands and the President of the Republic and Vice-President of the R.G.C. were astonished that the Ministers of the Interior and Defense and the D.C. did not attend the reception ceremony. They enquired from each other about the reason for their absence and Abdul Haliq al Samarraie and Muhammad Tahir were among those to whom enquiries were made and both of them said that they were probably absent because they were preoccupied with a special duty at the time when

they were aware of the details of the plot. On the arrival of the telegram of Nadhim Khar to the Office of the President of the Republic, he invited the Vice-President of the R.G.C. and the Command (of the Party) to an urgent meeting. In the first instance it was reckoned that the operation had been engineered by hostile quarters which employed the 'method' of telegram for delusion. But after an urgent consideration of the situation, the Command decided to issue strict orders for the internment of Nadhim Khar. The President of the Republic thereupon immediately issued orders to the armed forces and organisations of the Party and the Peoples organisations to pursue Nadhim Khar and his collaborators and to intern them. Similarly, all the measures provided for in the Special Emergency Plan of the Party and the armed forces at Baghdad and throughout Iraq were enforced.

The official spokesman stressed that preparations were under way for the plot since six months, and that the plot did not depend on a large number of supporters. The plot primarily depended on Nadhim Khar and a number of persons attached to him at the Directorate General of Security and the Second Investigating Committee controlled by Nadhim Khar directly. The plot also depended on such machinery, means and places as may be within the reach of Nadhim Khar by virtue of his office in the Security Department. The plotters wrongly imagined that by interning a number of responsible men and by assassinating the President of the Republic and Vice-President of the R.G.C. the atmosphere will be clear to them to enforce their evil aims which are hostile to the interests of the Party, the Revolution and the masses of the people.

As to the service men whose names were mentioned in the list of criminals who were executed the day before yesterday, the official spokesman said that they consisted of service men who were attached since 5 years to the Headquarters of the Second Investigating Committee controlled by Nadhim Khar, to serve as guards.

The Special Court convened on 8 July 1973 under the presidency of Saiyid Izzat al Duri and the membership of Saiyid Tahir Ahmad Amin and Saiyid Khalil Ibrahim al Azzawi and issued the following sentences :-

1. The Court sentenced to death the following :-

1. Abdul Khaliq Ibrahim Khalil al Samarraie
2. Muhammad Fadhil
3. Security Captain Daud Hamid al Durra
4. Security Captain Latif Rashid al Tamimi
5. Naji Jamil al Dulaimi
6. Nasir Finjan al Saudi
7. Lt. Hasan Ibrahim al Muta'iri (Public Security)
8. Security Lt. Muhammad Mutar Husain
9. Security Inspector Muwaffaq Naji Saleh
10. Security Lt. Sadi Sadiq Nusayyif
11. Security Inspector Ismail Abid Muhammad Ahmad
12. Amin Abdullah Amin al Karawi
13. Fuad Muhammad Hamid nicknamed Fuad al 'Awwad
14. Security Inspector Abdul Hadi Ali Abdullah

under Article 190 read with Article 156 of the Penal Code.

2. The Court sentenced to life imprisonment Security Lt. Hasan al Hamdani under Article 190 of the Penal Code.
3. The Court sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 2 years Ali Ridha Bawa under Article 247 of the Penal Code.
4. The Court sentenced to hard labour for one year Salim Hamid al Shagra under Article 247 of the Penal Code.
5. The Court acquitted the following :-
Air Captain Muthanna Rashid Abdul Razzaq al Juburi
Security Lt. Karim Mut'ib

Security Inspector Abdul Wahhab Saleh Darfash
Security Inspector Sami Mahmud Nijris
Security Inspector Abdul Razzaq Hamid Saleh
Security Inspector Khalid Muhammad Salih
Security Inspector Abdul Rahman Mutlak al Duri
Sergeant Major Security Falih Uthman Hamid
"Amin Mumtaz" (?) Sabih Radhi Zeboon
" " Radhi Saleh Gumar
" " Hamid Nasir Ahmad
Security Inspector Wajih Dhakir Wafi
Nashmi Seraisir Husain
Corporal Jabbar
Security Inspector Abbas Hamza Muhammad
Security Inspector Muhammad Abdul Razzaq Muhammad
Security Inspector Wadhah Ibrahim Adham
Security Inspector Abdul Razzaq Wahayyib Ibrahim
Security Inspector Khalil Ibrahim Latif
"Amin" Talib Challab Akhu Barshe

under Article 182 (c) of the Criminal Procedure Regulations and to release them from detention unless they were detained for some other reason.


5. A Republican Ordinance was later issued by the President endorsing the sentences passed by the Special Court excepting that of Abdul Khaliq Ibrahim Khalil al Samarraie whose sentence was commuted to hard labour for life.

7. All those sentenced to death were executed last night and they consist of the second and last batch of the clique of Nadhin Kzar.

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British Embassy
Tehran



(52)

P R H Wright Esq
Middle East Department
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference 1/16

Date 12 July 1973

Dear Patricia,

IRAQ INTERNAL SITUATION

1. When I called on Khalatbari yesterday, I also asked him whether he had come to any conclusions about the purposes of the conspirators in the recent affair in Baghdad. Khalatbari said that the Ministry had so far reached no firm position on this subject, but their preliminary view was that it was an internal Iraqi matter. It looked to them as though the conspiracy had been an attempt by one group within the ruling clique to seize power from another. At first they thought that the conspirators were aiming to unseat the President. They were now more inclined to think that it had been an attempt to unseat both the President and Saddam Hussein Takriti (and those most closely associated with them). But, Khalatbari repeated, they still had come to no firm conclusions.

2. Khalatbari said that one interesting point was that an Iraqi called Nasr Fenjan had been amongst those shot when the attempted plot had failed. Nasr Fenjan had some time ago been a member of the Interests Section in Tehran where his activities had led to an Iranian demand that he should be recalled. Subsequently, Nasr Fenjan had turned up in Islamabad and it was principally in his office that the arms had been discovered. It now looked, therefore, as though Nasr Fenjan must have been working in some way with Kazzar, and they were wondering whether the despatch of arms to Pakistan had perhaps been an idea conceived by Kazzar and his group within the Iraqi ruling clique and not fully approved by the Iraqi Government as a whole. ("Nasr Fenjan" was what I thought Khalatbari said, but I should perhaps add that we have been unable to trace any record of an Iraqi of that name.)

3. The only other point that Khalatbari made was that they did not think that Kazzar and the others had been heading in

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the direction of Iran when they tried to escape after the plot's failure. According to Iranian information, the conspirators were heading northwards, and the MFA believed that they had been hoping to achieve sanctuary with the Kurds. I asked Khalatbari if he thought that the Kurds had been privy to the plot. Khalatbari said that they had no information to suggest that this was the case. He simply meant that Kazzar and his friends, having failed in their objectives, then decided that the Kurdish areas would be the safest place for them to go.

Yours Sincerely
Nick Brown

for R H Ellingworth

cc: G L Bullard Esq, ISLAMABAD

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TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELNO 200 OF 16 JULY 1973.

48- YOUR TELNO 288: SAADOUN GHAI DAN

1. WE SHOULD PREFER NO (NO) INFORMATION TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS,
SINCE TO DO SO MIGHT COMPLICATE PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS HERE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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MR LE QUESNE


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
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GENERAL GHaidan : IRAQI MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

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1. On 8 July General Saadoun Ghaidan asked the Home Secretary for visas for himself and a party of five to visit London and for protection during his stay (Baghdad telegram 276). We have now agreed to his request (FCO telegram of 13 July).
 2. There was initially stiff opposition from the Home Office. This was based on:
 - (a) Ghaidan's alleged connections with the Public Relations Bureau (the terrorist arm of the Baath Party);
 - (b) the presence of a number of aides, who might also have PRB connections;
 - (c) the overstretched resources of the Special Branch.
 3. The FCO arguments in favour of his admission were set out in Lady Tweedsmuir's letter of 10 July.
 4. Following confirmation that the aides were "clean", and the Prime Minister's view that the visas should be issued if possible, the Home Secretary withdrew his objections.

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P R H Wright
Middle East Dept

16 July 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

Amendments to Iraqi Provisional Constitution

Baghdad home service 1900 gmt 13 July 73

Text of report:

The Revolution Command Council has issued Decision No. 567 dated 13th July introducing important amendments to the provisional Constitution. The decision reads as follows:

In accordance with Paragraph B of Article 63 of the provisional Constitution, the Revolution Command Council decided the following during the session on 8th July 1973:

Article 1 The following article shall be added to the end of Chapter One, Part IV of the provisional Constitution and the subsequent articles shall be renumbered accordingly:

Article 45 The Supreme Financial Control Authority shall be formed and shall come under the Revolution Command Council. The Authority's department and its functions shall be regulated by a law.

Article 2 Paragraph A of Article 56 of the provisional Constitution shall be cancelled and the following shall be inserted instead:

Article 57 (a) The President of the Republic is the Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He shall assume the executive authority directly or through the Cabinet.

Article 3 Article 57 of the provisional Constitution shall be canceled and the following inserted instead:

Article 58 The President of the Republic shall directly assume the following powers:

(a) Safeguarding the independence and integrity of the country's territory, safeguarding internal and external security and looking after the citizens' rights and freedoms.

(b) Supervising the sound implementation of the Constitution, law and decisions, court judgements and development projects throughout the Iraqi Republic.

(c) Appointing and dismissing Vice Presidents.

(d) Appointing and dismissing Ministers.

(e) Appointing and dismissing governors, judges, civil servants and military officials in accordance with the law.

(f) Appointing diplomatic representatives in Arab and foreign countries and delegates to international conferences and organizations.

(g) Granting military ranks and medals in accordance with the law.

(h) Holding negotiations and concluding agreements and treaties as necessary.

(i) Approving diplomatic and international representatives and asking for their recall.

7) Ratifying death sentences and issuing special amnesties.

(k) Guiding the control of ministries' and public establishments' activities and coordination among them.

Article 4 The following shall be added to Chapter IV of the Constitution and the chapters and articles shall be renumbered accordingly:

Article 60 (a) The Cabinet shall consist of the Ministers and shall be headed by the President of the Republic; (b) The President of the Republic convenes the Cabinet and runs its sessions.

Article 61 The Cabinet shall assume the following powers:

- (a) Drafting laws and submitting them to the competent legislative authority.
- (b) Issuing administrative regulations and decisions in accordance with the law.
- (c) Appointing, promoting, dismissing and retiring civil servants in accordance with the law.
- (d) Drawing up the state's general plan.
- (e) Preparing the state general budget and its appendices.
- (f) Concluding and granting loans and supervising the organization and administration of currency.
- (g) Proclaiming and terminating a total or partial state of emergency in accordance with the law.
- (h) Supervising public utilities and official and semi-official organizations.

Article 5 This decision shall come into effect from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.

[Signed:] Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, the Revolution Command Council Chairman.

...and development projects throughout the Iraqi Republic

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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 291 OF 18TH JULY 1973.

BAATH-IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY JOINT STATEMENT.

JOINT STATEMENT BY BAATH PARTY AND
IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY ON FORMATION
OF NATIONAL FRONT WAS ISSUED ON
17 JULY. NEED FOR CONSTRUCTIVE
DIALOGUE WITH KURDISH DEMOCRATIC
PARTY WAS MENTIONED, TEXT AS
PUBLISHED IN BAGHDAD OBSERVER ON
18 JULY FOLLOWS BY BAG.

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now all'd below

FIKES.

MRD.

I.R.D.

PUS D.

NENAD.

MR. LE QUESNE

MR. PARSONS.

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Ref. our memo. 291 of 18 July.



Handwritten signature/initials

With the compliments of

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 35

26 JUL 1973



~~BRITISH EMBASSY~~

BAGHDAD

Regard

Enter these 2 articles separately
on 1 reg internal (Political
section in 1 reg) - 25/26/7

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY LAW AMENDED

Revolutionary Command Council promulgated the law amending National Assembly Law No. 223 of 1970 by resolution No. 75 of July 16, 1973. Following is the text of the amendment:

ARTICLE ONE: The National Assembly shall convene in Baghdad and may be held somewhere else if necessary in accordance with a decision by the chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council.

ARTICLE TWO: The Assembly term of office shall be three years beginning from the date of its first meeting and ending by the end of the last meeting held in its third year.

The Assembly shall be convened to its first annual session on the first Saturday of October. The session shall end

by the end of December. The second session shall begin the first Saturday of March and shall end by the end of June.

ARTICLE THREE: The Assembly shall be made up of 100 members.

ARTICLE FOUR: The Revolutionary Command Council shall select the members of the Assembly from the representatives of the various political, economic and social sectors of the people and from among the patriotic elements and progressive forces.

(Continued on page 8)

ARTICLE 53 stipulates that the National Assembly will consider the draft law presented

BAKR THANKS CONGRATULATORS

President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr has addressed a telegram of thanks to the three Soviet leaders, Leonid Brezhnev, Nikolai Podgorny and Alexei Kosygin in reply to the telegram of greeting they sent on the anniversary of the two immortal July revolutions.

The President also sent telegrams of thanks to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt; Sd. Salem Robaya Ali, Chairman of the Presidential Council of Democratic Yemen; Qadhi Abdul Rahman al-Iryani, Chairman of the Republican Council of Yemen; Sheikh Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah, the Emir of Kuwait; King Hassan II of Morocco; King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; Prince Hassan Bin Talal Crown Prince and Vice Royal of Jordan; President Gird of India and President Mubtarr Ould Dada of

PRESIDENT CONDOLES EMIR OF KUWAIT

President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr has addressed a telegram of condolences to Sheikh Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah, the Emir of Kuwait on the death of Sheikh Hmoud al-Jaber al-Sabah.

A similar telegram of condolences was sent by Sd. Saddam Hussein, Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council.

4-man Iraqi industrial delegation visits Indian establishments

A four-man delegation from Iraq led by Sd. Adnan al-Kindi, President of State Organisation of Industrial Design and Construction, is now on a visit to India with a view to finding effective means of collaboration between India and Iraq for setting up industrial projects

The delegation met Mr. M. Gandhi, Secretary, Ministry of Industry, Government in New Delhi on July the delegation held with the Planning officials of the Heavy Industry of Steel (India) Media Ltd., and

JULY 17 REVOLUTION IS OF ALL ARAB MASSES SAYS CAIRO DAILY

Cairo, Tuesday.

Al-Jumhuriyah newspaper of Cairo has stated that the progressive July 17 revolution "is the revolution of all Arab masses."

The newspaper went on to say that a review of the crucial battles which crossed the path of the July 17 revolution over the past 5 years is sufficient to bring to the forefront the revolution's progressive identity. "The nationalisation of oil came as the peak of the mighty accomplishments of the revolution," it said.

Al-Jumhuriyah of Cairo went on to note the deep conviction of revolutionary Iraq that the Palestine issue is the central issue in Arab struggle and is dialectically associated with the struggle for unity and liberty and for the building of socialism. Hence Iraq's unwavering rejection of all liquidationist solutions

In conclusion, the newspaper observed that the July 17 revolution is, by reason of its progressive and anti-imperialistic character, an integral part of the world anti-imperialistic revolutions. — INA

TALABANI INAUGURATES THARTHAR IRRIGATION PROJECTS

Sd. Mukarram Al-Talabani, Minister of Irrigation, inaugu-

BAKR THANKS MRS. GANDHI

President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr has addressed a message of thanks to Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India in reply to the condolences she had sent on the death of Lt-Gen. Hammad Shehab, RCC Member and Minister of Defence.

PROJECTS GIVEN THE GREEN LIGHT BY THE PLANNING BOARD

The Steering Committee of the Planning Board appropriated in its meeting held last Sunday under the chairmanship of Dr. Jawad Hashim, Minister of Planning, a sum of three millions five hundred and eighty-four Dinars for building a number of health and services projects in the country for the year 73/74.

It appropriated a sum of IDs. 2,159,000 for the sewage system of the Governorate of Baghdad and for the enlargement and strengthening of the sewage network.

It, meanwhile, appropriated IDs. 1,325,000 to enlarge the potable and river water network and for increasing the

President receives more telegrams of greetings

President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr has received more telegrams of greetings from heads of state on the July anniversaries.

Among the senders were Mr. Pal Lu Shenzi chairman of the State Council of the Hungarian People's Republic, President George Pompidou of France, Emperor Hirohito of Japan and Mr. Antoni Gemamo Governor General of Malta.

The President also received a telegram of greetings from Sd. Abdul Latif Baltiyah Secretary-General of the International Confederation of Arab Trade Union.

Walter Ulbrecht, Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, Willi Stoph, GDR Prime Minister and President Kim Il Sung of Democratic Korea. — INA

Qassim Hammoudi receives greetings from journalists unions

Sd. Sa'ad Qassim Hammoudi, Chairman of the Journalists Union has received messages of greetings on the July anniversaries from each of the International Journalists Organisation and the Journalists Union of Democratic Korea.

ABSP-CP ACCORD ON NATIONAL FRONT

NR12

An act of great historic importance

BAKR: "WE WANT A DURABLE FRONT, NOT A FRONT THAT RISES TODAY ONLY TO CRUMBLE TOMORROW"

A joint statement was signed by the Arab Baath Socialist Party and the Iraqi Communist party at the Presidential Palace at 6:25 yesterday evening. The joint statement announced agreement of the two parties on the National Action Charter and on the rules of action within the progressive national and nationalist front.

The statement was signed by Comrade Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Secretary-General of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, and Comrade Aziz Mohammed, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party. Present at the signing ceremony was Comrade Shibly al-Aysami, Assistant Secretary-General of the Arab Baath Socialist Party; Comrade Saddam Hussein, Deputy Secretary-General of the Regional Leadership; a number of comrades of the Party's National and Regional leadership and members of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party.

Comrade Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr made the following address: "Comrades: What has been achieved today is an act of great historic importance and a prominent turning-point in the relations between the ABSP and the Iraqi CP as well as in the efforts made to build progressive national and nationalist front. Today's achievement is bound to produce positive effects on the struggle mounted by our people against imperialism, Zionism and reaction and for building and progress. Our Party, the Arab Baath Socialist Party, which

shouldered the responsibility of the revolutionary changes on July 17 and 30, 1968, and the responsibility of assuming political power and leading revolutionary transformations over the past five years has, on every occasion, stressed the importance of coalition between progressive national and nationalist forces so they could discharge their positive role in building the homeland and deepening the revolutionary advance. It also stressed the historic importance of the building of the progressive national and nationalist front whether in respect to national struggle or to pan-Arab struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction. May I now repeat what I said yesterday that what we want is not a front that rises today only to crumble tomorrow. What we are after is a strong and durable front with strategic horizons and long-range strategic assignments — a front that can serve as a useful model to progressive national forces throughout the Arab homeland. It is a pleasure to me and to my comrades to arrive today at an ag-



Comrades Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Secretary-General of the ABSP Leadership, and Aziz Mohammed, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party, signing the agreement on establishment of national front.

reement with the Iraqi Communist Party over the National Action Charter and the rules of work inside the front and lay the foundations for the construction of the front for which we struggled so long. It gives me pleasure on this occasion to note that widespread

positive relations have been holding our two parties together for a long time now. In the course of this period the Iraqi Communist Party emphasised its cooperation with us and its appreciation of the country's circumstances and the contingencies of struggle at this sta-

ge.

DIALOGUE WITH KDP

"I should also like to stress on this occasion that we will endeavour to the best of our abilities to bring to completion the dialogue with brothers in the Kurdistan Democratic Party so we can arrive at an identical agreement with them. This is our aim as we have

SPEECHES AT JULY REVOLUTIONS CELEBRATIONS MASS RALLY

Sd. Dara Tawfiq, member of the Political Bureau of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, in a speech on behalf of the Party delivered at the mass rally held at Al-Shaab Sports Stadium Monday evening on the occasion of the July revolutions celebrations, called for the establishment of a solid national front for enhancing national unity. He added:

"The imperialists dangers encircling the country on the domestic and foreign levels call upon the loyal sons of our Iraqi people to intensify their efforts for establishing a solid national front for enhancing national unity and Arab-Kurdish brotherhood on durable foundations through implementing the remaining articles of the historic March 11 Manifesto and achieving autonomy for Kurdistan as part of the Iraqi republic and ensuring the equality of the patriotic forces on the basis of the role performed by each in the political life of our society."

Sd. Tawfiq then went on to say: "The resolute measures taken by the authorities against Nadhem Gzar and his clique which has caused damage to the authorities of the people of the patriotic have been received by and support on the masses of our Iraqi peoples and their patriotic forces. The acts carried out by this clique for some time, culminating in plotting against the regime, had always constituted a negative phenomenon in the life of the country. It gravely discredited this country and stood as a basic obstacle in the way of positive developments in the affairs of the country; which fact calls for ex-

amining this serious disorderly phenomenon and the causes of its rise and continuance, working out effective guarantees against their repetition in one form or another in the future, and building up another positive method of work prevailing in the relationship between the citizens and the state."

Sd. Tawfiq said in conclusion "Let us make the July anniversaries an incentive and a starting point for continuing the march along the path of construction and progress, of strengthening the national unity of our people and enhancing our national independence, and for achieving more gains and victories."

He was followed by Sd. Karim Ahmed, Member of the Political Bureau of the Iraqi Communist Party, who said:

"The concern shown by our Iraqi Communist Party for the subject of the progressive national front arises not only out of regional and local assessments, but also out of wider and more extensive ones. The Arab liberation movement, including the valiant Palestinian Resistance Movement, is facing a vicious imperialist-Zionist-reactionary onslaught aimed at toppling the emancipated Arab regimes, liquidating the Palestinian Resistance and imposing

ing in the perpetuation of the hateful Zionist occupation of Arab territories and preventing the Palestinian Arab people from returning to their lands and determining their destiny there, and protecting the sources of Arab oil in order to remain at the service of world imperialism and its oil monopolies. The opposition and frustration of this imperialist-Zionist-reactionary onslaught, and the achievement of new victories for the Arab liberation movement, are dependent, as we Communists believe, on unleashing the energies of the Arab masses and mobilising them in militant national fronts enabling them hold their destinies in their own hands and tackle the tasks facing the Arab liberation movement."

Sd. Ahmed then said: "Our people and the patriotic regime have achieved a major victory by foiling the reactionary treacherous plot of Nadhem Gzar, which ventured upon executing its criminal scheme on the eve of the glorious July anniversaries. Had its plots succeeded, they would have turned these festivities into new tragedies and sufferings for our people and their progressive patriotic parties and all their righteous forces."

Sd. Ahmed then said: "The extirpation of this abnormal phenomenon requires not only its condemnation and the exposure of its methods and crimes, but also entrenchment against it and against all imperialist-reactionary plots by means of establishing constitutional, legislative and judicial institutions, ensurance of democratic legality, and guaranteeing full freedom of political, ideological and mobilisational activity for the patriotic parties

importance.

The Agency report pointed out in particular the agrarian reform and the national exploitation of oil. It wrote: "These two fields are outstanding landmarks in the development of the country. The agricultural transformations in Iraq, especially those affected by the Agrarian Reform Law of 1970, are really profound ones. The development of the cooperative movement among the peasants has become an important supplementary part of the agrarian reform in Iraq. There are at present about 1400 cooperatives in the country comprising the peasants who own 80 per cent of the land requisitioned from the feudalists in keeping with the Agrarian Reform Law. During the next five years, most of these cooperatives are to be changed into collective farms along socialist lines."

The Agency added that one of the important features of the development of Iraq is its victory in the oil front which has enabled it to start oil production on the basis of possessing its own sources by nationalising one of the biggest foreign companies namely, the Iraq Petroleum Company.

The national oil company has also been established not only to embark on the development of oil fields in North Rumaila, but also to undertake the training of efficient cadres in the future to shoulder the full responsibility for the complicated process of oil extraction, transport and marketing in an independent manner.

The Soviet press agency said that the policy followed by the Arab Baath Socialist Party in Iraq and the similar line adhered to by the other democratic forces in the country have resulted in the announcement of a draft charter calling for the establishment of a progressive national front.

Novosti stressed that Iraq has been following a policy of growing friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and said that a new page of Iraqi-Soviet relations has been sealed by the Friendship and cooperation Treaty between the two countries which reflected the growing desire of both sides for the maintenance of friendship and cooperation in the interests of both countries and of peace in the area and the whole world.

JULY CELEBRATIONS PARTY IN MOSCOW

Moscow, July 16.

Sd. Saleh Mehdi Ammash, Iraq's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, held yesterday evening a grand party at the Iraqi Embassy on the occasion of the July 14 and 17 revolutions' celebrations.

The party was attended by Comrade Novikov, Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, a number of cabinet ministers, the Commander of the Soviet Navy, members of the Supreme Soviet, the foreign and Arab diplomatic missions, senior officials of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and members of the Iraqi community in Moscow.

ADMINISTRATION OF DISTRIBUTION OF OIL PRODUCTS

NOTICE FOR SECRET TENDER NO. TAWZEE 27/1973

FOR SUPPLY OF CASH SAFES (50) NOS.

1 — Tenders are invited from tenderers who are classified and have renewed their membership of the Chamber of Commerce and possess Income Tax Certificate for the Current Year, for the supply of the above cash safes, in accordance with specifications and conditions on payment of ID. 1/000 (Iraqi Dinar One only) which is non-refundable.

2 — Tenderer's quotations must be accompa-

(Continued from page 1)

in its general activities. I should like to congratulate you, comrades, on this happy occasion and wish our great people victory in their forward advance. I implore Allah to guide the footsteps of all of us for serving the good of this people. Peace be with you."

Next to speak was comrade Aziz Mohammed, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Iraqi CP.

Following is the text of his address: "Dear Comrade Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr! Dear comrades of the National and Regional leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party. Permit me on this important occasion to share with you the feelings of satisfaction and pleasure on this major accomplishment achieved today as the result of sincere endeavours exerted by our two parties. In the name of the Central Committee of our Iraqi Communist Party, I should like to express full endorsement of the views expressed in your valuable address. As a matter of fact, the step which we accomplished today assumes historical importance and regard to the conditions with which our country is now living and the role which our alliance is to play in realising cohesion among the forces of our people and cementing the ranks of our revolutionary national unity.

"Dear Comrade, I concur with what you expressed of the necessity of resuming our joint efforts with the brothers of the Kurdistan Democratic Party so as to bring the dialogue to completion and arrive at a strong and comprehensive front that can also combine the progressive democratic and nationalist forces which will have a role to play in the leading body of the front as well as in the front's activities.

"Permit me to express thanks for your nice words about the positive attitudes of our party and for your appraisal of its efforts for cooperation and for the realisation of the front. It is something of historic implication that this event which we are celebrating today comes to pass on July 17, the day on which the revolutionary change, led by the Arab Baath Socialist Party, was accomplished and in whose streamline major achievements were also accomplished in the interest of the people and the Arab nation.

"On this occasion, I am proud to refer to the positive role assumed by Comrade Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and the rest of the leading comrades of the Baath Party for guaranteeing success to our joint efforts and for arriving at this agreement,

but half the task devolving upon our shoulders. Together, we must accomplish the other half by transforming it into something real in the life of our people. It is very important to emphasise the necessity of wakefulness towards the machinations of hostile forces. Without doubt, such forces will intensify their efforts to undermine or sabotage this alliance. From now on we must fortify ourselves against such attempts.

The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP went on to say that "our ambitions, we the Communists, do not stop at the limit of this militant document, nor at the limit of coalition relations between our two parties. He noted that as soon as a person ceased to be ambitious he also ceased to be revolutionary.

TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT

Following is the text of the joint statement:

"Fellow countrymen: Masses of our struggling people! A great national accomplishment was today achieved up the road of building the progressive national and nationalist front. Meaningful dialogue, permeated with the spirit of responsibility, led to agreement between the Arab Baath Socialist Party and the Iraqi Communist Party on the National Action Charter and the rules of work inside the progressive national and nationalist front. It will be recalled that the two parties had exerted sustained efforts on behalf of the emergence of this front and so that it may realise the hopes of the people and the ambitions of the masses.

"In the course of the joint efforts made towards the agreement, the two parties have been and still are taking into consideration the necessity of the presence of the Kurdistan Democratic Party as a fundamental and active partner in the front.

"The ABSP and the CP, in proclaiming the above-mentioned agreement, stress their determination to proceed with the constructive and meaningful efforts to bring to completion the dialogue with the Kurdistan Democratic Party. They hope that the will for good and the joint national interests of the masses of the people — Arabs, Kurds and fraternal national minorities in the same homeland — shall always remain the guiding norm of all in their noble efforts to build the progressive national and nationalist front.

"The creation of this front responds to a major objective advocated and struggled for by all progressive parties and forces. It is also in response to the aspirations of the masses

people's triumphs scored on July 14 and July 17, the agreement between the ABSP and the CP provides an indicator to the birth of the people's front whose emergence constitutes a prominent historic event in the life of our country and a major step along the road of consolidating the advance of the victorious July 17 revolution and resuming the revolutionary march of our people started by the immortal revolution of July 14, 1958.

"The advance of the revolutionary movement in Iraq and in many other parts of the Arab homeland has conclusively shown that one of the most salient factors contributing to the solidity and stamina of the movement is its awareness of the importance of alliance between its vanguard battalions within the scope of a united front. Conversely, one of the most effective factors contributing to defeats and setbacks has been a decline in this awareness and a propensity on the part of the above-mentioned battalions to give predominance to secondary contradictions among them over the major contradiction with imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

NATIONAL EPICS

"The periods that witnessed the rise of the national front in Iraq or trends towards coalition were periods of national epics and victorious uprisings in some of which the people scored memorable victories.

"The agreement between the two militant parties, the ABSP and the CP, and the rise of the progressive national and nationalist front constitute a shining landmark along the road of serious work to achieve the coalition of progressive national and nationalist parties and forces. The two parties reflecting full sense of responsibility, proclaim determination to consolidate the alliance between them, create the comprehensive progressive national and nationalist front and wholly adhere to the interests and national and nationalist aspirations of the people.

"The formulation of the principles, objectives and rules of action on which agreement has been reached in militant and effective instruments is bound to inject great energies into the revolutionary movement of our country, side by side with outstanding capacity for endurance in the face of the machinations of the imperialistic and reactionary forces.

ROLE OF REACTION

"Fellow countrymen! Our country by virtue of its anti-imperialistic revolutionary line and major progressive accomplishments scored under the

ion as well as the consolidation of national peace, the realisation of self-rule for the Kurdish people and the repelling of the conspiracies woven up by the imperialistic quarters and the forces of Arab and neighbouring reaction.

"Iraq, however is qualified to discharge its national and nationalist duties and is equipped with everything needed to repel such hazards and reply to them with efficiency and firmness. The mobilisation of the people has now become an overriding national and nationalist assignment and a time-honoured method of action. The ABSP, the CP and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, side by side with the rest of the progressive democratic and nationalist forces, possess rich revolutionary experiences and are capable of giving battle to and defeating the imperialists and the enemies of the people.

"Cooperation between the progressive, democratic and nationalist parties and forces allied in the front represents a great stride towards accomplishing all the national, nationalist and democratic assignments specified in the National Action Charter, side by side with proceeding along the road of national progress and nationalist unity and preparing for transition to socialism. The cooperation in question also serves to consolidate the principles of justice and lawfulness and the right of the citizen to security, freedom and democracy.

"The ABSP and the CP, in declaring full adherence to the National Action Charter, emphasise adherence to the line of firm struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction and to nationalist solidarity, Arab unity and the consolidation of cooperation and alliance with the forces of socialism and progress around the world.

"The building of the progressive national and nationalist front in Iraq and the front's active struggle for achieving its objectives and realising meaningful cooperation between its parties, serve to make of it an inspiring model worthy of emulation by national liberation movement in the Arab homeland and other countries.

"The ABSP and the CP invite the people to action and struggle and seek arbitration in the people's free will and invincible power for the achievement of its ambitions and objectives.

"Greetings to our great people: Arabs, Kurds and national minorities!

"Congratulations from the two allied parties to the people in the anniversaries of the people's revolutions and victories!

Asir Mohammed, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Iraqi CP.

Following is the text of his address: "Dear Comrade Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr! Dear comrades of the National and Regional leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party. Permit me on this important occasion to share with you the feelings of satisfaction and pleasure on this major accomplishment achieved today as the result of sincere endeavours exerted by our two parties. In the name of the Central Committee of our Iraqi Communist Party, I should like to express full endorsement of the views expressed in your valuable address. As a matter of fact, the step which we accomplished today assumes historical importance and regard to the conditions with which our country is now living and the role which our alliance is to play in realising cohesion among the forces of our people and cementing the ranks of our revolutionary national unity.

"Dear Comrade, I concur with what you expressed of the necessity of resuming our joint efforts with the brothers of the Kurdistan Democratic Party so as to bring the dialogue to completion and arrive at a strong and comprehensive front that can also combine the progressive democratic and nationalist forces which will have a role to play in the leading body of the front as well as in the front's activities.

"Permit me to express thanks for your nice words about the positive attitudes of our party and for your appraisal of its efforts for cooperation and for the realisation of the front. It is something of historic implication that this event which we are celebrating today comes to pass on July 17, the day on which the revolutionary change, led by the Arab Baath Socialist Party, was accomplished and in whose streamline major achievements were also accomplished in the interest of the people and the Arab nation.

"On this occasion, I am proud to refer to the positive role assumed by Comrade Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and the rest of the leading comrades of the Baath Party for guaranteeing success to our joint efforts and for arriving at this agreement. While celebrating the signing of this historic document we should like to note, in the name of our party, that we look forward to yet bigger accomplishments and to seeing today's achievement run its full historic course. For this purpose, much will depend on our mutual endeavours. We should translate this document into reality and disseminate in it the spirit of vitality and the spirit of struggle. This is because our conclusion of this document is

ourselves against such attempts.

The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP went on to say that "our ambitions, we the Communists, do not stop at the limit of this militant document, nor at the limit of coalition relations between our two parties. He noted that as soon as a person ceased to be ambitious he also ceased to be revolutionary.

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"In the course of the joint efforts made towards the agreement, the two parties have been and still are taking into consideration the necessity of the presence of the Kurdistan Democratic Party as a fundamental and active partner in the front.

"The ABSP and the CP, in proclaiming their above-mentioned agreement, stress their determination to proceed with the constructive and meaningful efforts to bring to completion the dialogue with the Kurdistan Democratic Party. They hope that the will for good and the joint national interests of the masses of the people — Arabs, Kurds and fraternal national minorities in the same homeland — shall always remain the guiding norm of all in their noble efforts to build the progressive national and nationalist front.

"The creation of this front responds to a major objective advocated and struggled for by all progressive parties and forces. It is also in response to the aspirations of the masses and to the requirement of consolidating national unity and bringing to completion the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish issue in line with the historic March 11 Manifesto, and the requisites of success in the nationalist battle we are mounting against the imperialistic-Zionist enemy and his reactionary ally.

"In these days of festive celebrations marking the peo-

started by the immortal revolution of July 14, 1958.

"The advance of the revolutionary movement in Iraq and in many other parts of the Arab homeland has conclusively shown that one of the most salient factors contributing to the solidity and stamina of the movement is its awareness of the importance of alliance between its vanguard battalions within the scope of a united front. Conversely, one of the most effective factors contributing to defeats and setbacks has been a decline in this awareness and a propensity on the part of the above-mentioned battalions to give predominance to secondary contradictions among them over the major contradiction with imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

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"The periods that witnessed the rise of the national front in Iraq or trends towards coalition were periods of national epics and victorious uprisings in some of which the people scored memorable victories.

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"The formulation of the principles, objectives and rules of action on which agreement has been reached in militant and effective instruments is bound to inject great energies into the revolutionary movement of our country, side by side with outstanding capacity for endurance in the face of the machinations of the imperialistic and reactionary forces.

ROLE OF REACTION

"Fellow countrymen! Our country by virtue of its anti-imperialistic revolutionary line and major progressive accomplishments scored under the banner of the July 17 revolution, has become a target to conspiracies and attacks. Further, the situation in the Arab homeland is witnessing an escalation in the aggressive designs of the imperialistic and Zionist forces and is afflicted with the intensification of the role played by the reactionary and rightist forces. This state of affairs lays a major task on the shoulder of Iraq — the task of endurance and cohes-

to them with efficiency and firmness. The mobilisation of the people has now become an overriding national and nationalist assignment and a time-honoured method of action. The ABSP, the CP and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, side by side with the rest of the progressive democratic and nationalist forces, possess rich revolutionary experiences and are capable of giving battle to and defeating the imperialists and the enemies of the people.

"Cooperation between the progressive, democratic and nationalist parties and forces allied in the front represents a great stride towards accomplishing all the national, nationalist and democratic assignments specified in the National Action Charter, side by side with proceeding along the road of national progress and nationalist unity and preparing for transition to socialism. The cooperation in question also serves to consolidate the principles of justice and lawfulness and the right of the citizen to security, freedom and democracy.

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"The building of the progressive national and nationalist front in Iraq and the front's active struggle for achieving its objectives and realising meaningful cooperation between its parties, serve to make of it an inspiring model worthy of emulation by national liberation movement in the Arab homeland and other countries.

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"Greetings to our great people: Arabs, Kurds and national minorities!

"Congratulations from the two allied parties to the people in the anniversaries of the people's revolutions and victories!

"Forward to new victories!

"Long live the July 14 revolution and the July 17 revolution!

"Long live the progressive national and nationalist front."

Signed Asir Mohammed, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party.

Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Secretary-General of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party.

July 17, 1973.

RESTRICTED

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
BRITISH EMBASSY

MOSCOW

3/79

17 July 1973

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Dept
FCO



ELJ

*16613/9
p. 1*

Dear Burton,

Top copy entered on NRP 3/303/1

USSR/IRAQ

1. There have been one or two articles in the central press about Iraqi internal affairs, to mark the anniversary of the Iraq national holiday in commemoration of the events of 1958. There have also been reports of the departure of a Soviet party delegation to Iraq, led by Radishov (candidate Politburo member, and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbekistan Communist Party), to take part in celebrations there.
2. I am enclosing a copy of a translation of one such article, which may provide a useful quarry ~~on file of~~ for reference material. Its principal themes, apart from the flannel about Soviet/Iraqi relations, are agrarian reform (the significant changes for the better since the speeded-up development of cooperatives since 1968), oil (Iraq's victory over the Consortium was a "big break" in imperialist plans etc.), and internal stability (peace with the Kurds is an essential factor in securing the stability of the progressive regime etc). All this is fairly predictable stuff: but the passgae on the Kurds, and the role being played in achieving a united front by the Iraqi communists, is the fullest comment on Iraqi internal politics that I have seen during my short time here.

Yours ever,

R B Bone

Ryan Bone

RESTRICTED

IRAQ: NEW HORIZONS

Y. Primakov

In the last twenty years the Arab world has become one of the dynamic areas in Asia and Africa. In the fifties and sixties crushing blows were dealt to the colonial system here: the July revolution of 1952 in Egypt and the revolutions of 1958 and of 1968 in Iraq ended the reactionary regimes in these countries; the revolutionary movement of the Syrian people led to the establishment of a progressive regime in Syria; the Algerian national-liberation movement won a brilliant victory; and the national-liberation struggle in the south of the Arabian Peninsula was crowned with success.

The dynamism of the revolutionary changes in the Arab world has been determined not only by the broadening of the liberation process. This process has grown also in depth, leading a number of countries to the path of carrying out serious measures having not only an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal but also an anti-capitalist direction.

Of course, there have been ups and downs, successes and temporary setbacks for progressive forces in the politics and economic and social life of some Arab countries in the difficult conditions of the sharp class struggle and the aggressive policy of Israel. But, speaking of the events as a whole, the process of the deepening of progressive changes continues. Of special importance is the evolution which the Iraqi Republic has passed through in the last few years, joining the ranks of progressive Arab states.

To illustrate the scope and nature of the changes that have taken place in Iraq in the last three years, this author was told by one of the outstanding leaders of Iraq, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Revolutionary Command Saddam Hussein, one should in the first place mention the agrarian reform and the "oil victory".

These are really two important landmarks in the country's development. The agrarian changes in Iraq, particularly as a result of the second agrarian reform started in 1970, are fairly deep. Immediately after the triumph of the revolution of 1958 a law was passed on the turning over of landed estates to the peasants. The big landlords, however, took advantage of the shortcomings of this law. At the same time prior to 1968 people often held power in Bagdad, to whom the interests of the reform-dodging landlords were nearer than those of the working peasants. As a result of all this even ten years after the passage of the agrarian reform law only one-fourth of the land to be expropriated from the landlords under the reform was actually expropriated.

Thursday, July 12, 1973

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It is not accidental that after the revolution in 1968 special attention was devoted to the agrarian reform. In 1970 a new law was passed which declared measures to immediately and fully carry out agrarian changes in the country.

The development of the cooperative movement of the peasants has become an important integral part of the agrarian reform in Iraq. As of now, the country has about 1,400 cooperatives which incorporate peasants owning 80 per cent of the land expropriated from the landlords during the reform. The overwhelming majority of these cooperatives are consumers' and marketing cooperatives. However, within the next five years it is planned to transform them into collective farms on the basis of the socialisation of the land. Such farms already exist in Iraq.

Of no small importance in carrying out in practice the principles of the agrarian reform is the fact that Iraqi Baath members and Communists work for this jointly, shoulder to shoulder both in the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and in the localities.

An important landmark in Iraq's development was its victory on the "oil front"--the start of oil production on the basis of its own resources, the nationalisation of one of the major foreign companies.

A national oil company was set up in cooperation with the Soviet Union. It not only started the development of the oilfields in Northern Rumaila, but was also the basis for the training of personnel capable of taking with full responsibility in the future the complex business of oil extraction, transportation and marketing into their hands. On June 1, 1972, President of the Republic A.H. Bakr announced the nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company. After the failure of the attempts to organise the economic blockade of Iraq the IPC retreated. On February 28, 1973 an agreement was signed, in which the IPC recognized the nationalisation, accepted the compensation offered and agreed to pay its debt to Iraq. At the same time the daughter company of the IPC, the Basra Petroleum Company, which was not nationalised, pledged itself to raise the level of oil production in its oilfields already in the next few years.

It will be remembered that by the early 70s Western countries had adopted a "differentiated" approach to the development of oil and gas fields in different countries. Special emphasis was laid on the Middle East--a region accounting for the bulk of the explored oil resources of the capitalist world. To ensure "stable" oil supplies for the West they embarked on a policy of speeding up oil production in a number of countries. Provision of "stable" oil deliveries for the West

Thursday, July 12, 1973

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was only one aim. Another aim was to put additional pressure on the "refractory" Arab countries pursuing anti-imperialist policies. Through her victory over IPC Iraq made a big breach in this imperialist plan.

To carry out progressive domestic reforms Iraq needs internal stability, which is mainly ensured by the policy of achieving the unity of all progressive forces in the country. This policy of the Iraqi Baath Party and a similar line followed by other democratic forces in Iraq resulted in the working out of a draft charter appealing for the establishment of a progressive national front. All things considered, Iraq is now on the threshold of adopting this charter after several months of constructive exchanges of opinion on its various provisions held by the Baath Party, the Iraqi Communist Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party.

Peace with the Kurds is an essential factor in securing the stability of the progressive regime in Iraq. The Agreement of March 11, 1970, envisages the granting of autonomy, within the Iraqi Republic, to the Kurds, who account for one-fifth of the Iraqi population. It can confidently be stated that in the past implementation of revolutionary principles was in many respects prevented by the fratricidal Arab-Kurdish war in the North of the country, whereas peace with the Kurds provided fundamentally important conditions for Iraqi progress over recent years. Further socio-economic transformations in Iraq and her continued advances on the domestic and international scene in large measure depend on the complete solution of the Kurdish problem.

Anti-national elements, just as imperialist anti-Iraqi forces outside the country, realise it perfectly well. Hence-- the double, triple energy with which the foes of the Iraqi progressive system keep trying to fan up Arab-Kurdish differences.

At this juncture it is especially important to take speedy action to carry out in full the principles of the March 11, 1970 Agreement. In mid-June the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party sent its delegation headed by the Central Committee First Secretary Aziz Mohamed to the HQ of the Kurdish movement leader Barzani. An interchange of views was held on the continuing imperialist schemings against Iraq. Of exceptional significance is this part of the announcement on the visit to northern Iraq by the ICP delegation:

"The sides agreed that the chief factor guaranteeing Iraqi independence and sovereignty is national unity of Arabs and Kurds on the basis of the March statement, which provides for the autonomy and democracy of Kurdistan, as well as on the basis of the progressive front of three parties: the Baath Party, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Iraqi Communist Party." Commenting on this meeting, the Bagdad weekly al-Fikr al-Jadid said that it marked another step towards the establishment of a united front of democratic forces, helping improve Iraqi political life.

Thursday, July 12, 1973

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In her fight for development along the path of democracy and economic and social progress, against designs by external reaction, Iraq leans on the growing friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. A new phase in Iraqi-Soviet relations was opened by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Providing a long-term basis for Soviet-Iraqi cooperation in the political, economic and cultural fields, in the struggle for peace and social progress, this document mirrors the increasing desire of both countries to promote friendship and all-round cooperation which accords with their basic interests and the interests of peace and security in this region and throughout the world.

Several days from now Iraq will be celebrating the 15th anniversary of the July 14 Revolution and the 5th anniversary of the July 17 Revolution. These have been the most eventful years in the life of Iraq, years of strenuous fight and work by the Iraqi people, years opening new vistas before the country...

(Pravda, July 12. In full.)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

P Donovan Esq
British Interest Section
Royal Swedish Embassy
BAGHDAD

Your reference

Our reference NBR 1/2

Date 26 July 1973

Dear Peter,

*28/7/73
ja*

GENERAL SA'ADOUN GHAIIDAN

1 The Iraqi Interests Section here telephoned me earlier this week to inform me that they have managed to obtain a room for General Ghaidan at the University College Hospital for 6 August onwards. As you can imagine, they have experienced considerable difficulty in finding a vacant bed.

2 I note from a Baghdad radio report dated 24 July that General Ghaidan has resumed his duties at the Ministry of the Interior; his medical requirements would not therefore seem too pressing.

*Yours ever
Graham*

G S Burton
Middle East Department

CONFIDENTIAL

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

NBR/2

HE Mr A J Wilton CMG MC
KUWAIT

Your reference

Our reference

Date 26 July 1973

Dear Sir,

*Wsb/3/9
pa*

IRAQI MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

1. I think you should know that we received a request about 2 weeks ago from Baghdad to allow the Iraqi Minister of Interior, General Sa'adoun Ghaidan, to come to this country for medical treatment for the wounds incurred during the attempted coup on 30 June, coupled with a request for protection while he is here.
2. After considerable inter-Departmental discussion, Ministers agreed to this request, and the Iraqi Interests Section are at present trying to make arrangements (with some difficulty) to find General Ghaidan a place in a London hospital.
3. For security and other reasons, we naturally wish to keep this visit as confidential as possible. I thought, however, that you should know of it since the Kuwait Ambassador asked me today, when he called on me, whether it was true that a senior Iraqi minister was about to visit London for medical treatment. I told him about Ghaidan's visit in strict confidence and explained that he was having difficulty in finding a hospital bed. I did not give him any dates (which indeed are not certain). If asked, you should do your best to play down any suggestion that there is any political motive behind this visit.

[Signature]

[Signature]

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

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FM KUWAIT 260930Z



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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 700 OF 26 JULY INFO WASHINGTON

IRAQ

1. MY U S COLLEAGUE HAS TOLD ME THAT WHEN HE SAW THE FOREIGN MINISTER YESTERDAY THE LATTER SAID THAT HE THOUGHT RECENT EVENTS IN IRAQ HAD STRENGTHENED THE POSITION OF SADDAM HUSSAIN, WHOM HE EVIDENTLY CONSIDERED TO BE THE BEST OF A BAD BUNCH. HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD NOW BE A MOVE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND DIMINISH DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION. HE MENTIONED THE CLOSING OF E. EUROPEAN CULTURAL CENTRES IN BAGHDAD LAST MONTH. THE EXPLAINED AWAY THE IMMINENT INCLUSION OF MORE COMMUNIST MINISTERS IN THE GOVERNMENT AS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE A BALANCE WITH OTHER "NATIONAL FRONT" FORCES (STOLTZFUS FOUND HIM A BIT OBSCURE ON THIS).

2. SHORTLY AFTER STOLTZFUS HAD TOLD ME THE ABOVE I READ ROBERT GRAHAM'S PIECE IN THE FINANCIAL TIMES OF 25 JULY, WHICH SAYS VERY MUCH THE SAME SORT OF THING. I DOUBT WHETHER THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO READ GRAHAM'S PIECE BY THE TIME HE SAW STOLTZFUS AT ABOUT 11100 HRS (0800 HRS GMT IN LONDON) YESTERDAY. HE IS MORE LIKELY TO HAVE HAD THESE VIEWS FROM THE KUWAITI MINISTER OF JUSTICE, LATELY AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD, ON HIS RETURN FROM THE INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS THERE LAST WEEK.

WILTON

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NEWS D

MR LE GUESNE

MR PARSONS

MR ROSE

SIR & ARTHUR

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Young

Mr Burt

NBK3/548/1.

KUWAIT AMBASSADOR'S CALL

1. The Kuwait Ambassador called on me this afternoon, ostensibly to ask about the recent visits of King Hussain, President Bhutto and the Shah of Iran. I gave him the brief background to King Hussain and President Bhutto's visits but told him that I was not equipped to give him any details. On the Shah's visit I explained that it was a private stopover on the way to the US and that the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister had taken the opportunity to have conversations with him. I said that I had not yet seen an account of the Prime Minister's talk with the Shah (this is true though I doubt whether the Kuwait Ambassador believed it) but thought that in conversation with both the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister, the Shah had probably concentrated mainly on Indo-Pakistan affairs in view of his own meeting later that day with President Bhutto and the recent visit of the Indian Foreign Minister to Tehran.

2. The Kuwait Ambassador said that he had heard that the Shah had complained about delays in the schedule for Chieftain tank deliveries. I said that I could not confirm this and, on the contrary, could tell him in confidence that the Shah had commented that there were no problems in his relations with us at the present time.

3. After some rather inconclusive discussion about the situation in Iraq, the Ambassador asked me whether it was true that a senior Iraqi minister was expected here for medical treatment. I said that it was true that the Minister of Interior had asked to come here to be treated for gunshot wounds incurred during the attempted coup on 30 June. I asked the Ambassador to treat this information in strict confidence though he commented that he had heard of it "the same day". I added that General Ghaidan was having some difficulty in finding a hospital bed, which the Ambassador said he could well understand.

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

26 July 1973


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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO. 953 OF 27 JULY 1973
YOUR TELNO 722: IRAQ

(20)

I WAS FINALLY ABLE TO SPEAK TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON 25 JULY IN A SHORT INTERVAL IN HIS PROGRAMME OF FOREIGN VISITS.

2. HE SEES SOME LIMITED PERSONAL RIVALRIES IN THE BAATH PARTY, BUT NOT A SERIOUS SPLIT: CERTAINLY NOTHING SERIOUS ENOUGH TO INFLUENCE CURRENT IRAQI FOREIGN POLICY. HE CONCEDED THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME STRUGGLE BETWEEN MILITARY ELEMENTS WHO WANTED TO TAKE OVER POWER FROM THE POLITICIANS AND THOSE WHO DID NOT. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE SUMMARY AND BRUTAL RETRIBUTION FOR THE MURDER OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE WOULD SERVE AS A WARNING TO THE FORMER ELEMENTS.

- see also
NSR 3/548/1
UK/Iraq relations

3. SO FAR AS TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ WERE CONCERNED, MR BAYULKEN DID NOT SEE THE RECENT EVENTS IN BAGDAD AFFECTING THESE. THEY CONTINUED FRIENDLY, AND A HIGH-RANKING IRAQI MINISTER WOULD SHORTLY BE VISITING TURKEY IN CONNECTION WITH THE OIL PIPELINE PROJECT WHICH BAYULKEN HAD MENTIONED TO MR AMERY HERE AT THE END OF MAY.

4. THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS OBVIOUSLY GRATIFIED AT BEING CONSULTED. IN THE COURSE OF OUR TALK HE NOTED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD RESUMED RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AND HE WONDERED IF WE WERE THINKING OF RESUMING WITH IRAQ (WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN A GENERAL MIDDLE EAST CONTEXT). I SAID WE REMAINED ON THE LOOKOUT FOR THE RIGHT MOMENT TO DO SO. FINALLY MR BAYULKEN ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS PERSONAL GOOD WISHES TO YOU AND MR AMERY.

PHILLIPS

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TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TEL NO 216 OF 1/8 1973

VISIT OF GENERAL SAADOUN GHAIIDAN

1. THE IRAQI INTERESTS SECTION HERE STILL HAS NO NEWS OF THE MINISTER'S PLANS. IF HE IS TO TAKE UP HIS RESERVATION AT THE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE HOSPITAL ON 6 AUGUST IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE POLICE HAVE DETAILS OF HIS TRAVEL AND ACCOMMODATION PLANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND BY FRIDAY 3 AUGUST AT THE LATEST. WITHOUT THEM IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PRODUCE SATISFACTORY PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS.
2. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF YOU WOULD NOW SEEK URGENTLY THE REQUIRED INFORMATION FROM THE MFA.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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P U S D
MR PARSONS

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(62)



British Embassy
Tehran

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 35
- 7 AUG 1973

NBR 1/2.

B Smith Esq
Middle East Dept.
FCO

Your reference

Our reference 1/16

Date 2 August 1973

Dear Sir,

Enter 2 *[Handwritten signature]* with ref.

BB 6/8
BB 6/8
pa

IRAQ INTERNAL SITUATION

(52) -
CMB here tag

1. Please refer to Dick Ellingworth's letter of 12 July to Patrick Wright.
2. The story that Khalatbari recounted on 11 July about the Iraqi allegedly called Nasr Fenjan appeared in the local press three days later. The name then given was Nasr As-Saudi. At the time we were not sure that Khalatbari had got the name right. I should record that we have now confirmed that As-Saudi was definitely the man.

Yours sincerely
NWB

N W Browne

Encl

cc: Chancery; Islamabad

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 311 OF 3 AUGUST. 1973.

(6) YRTEL 216.

MINISTER AND PARTY LEAVE ON SUNDAY 5 AUGUST BY BOAC

FLIGHT BA 763 ETA 1730 HOURS.

MINISTER WILL STAY AT RESIDENCE OF FORMER IRAQI AMBASSADOR
THAT NIGHT AND WILL ENTER HOSPITAL ON MONDAY 6 AUGUST.

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MR PARSONS

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TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO. 218 OF 3 AUGUST, 1973.

(68) - YOUR TELNO. 311: SAADOUN GHAI DAN.

1. ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION THE ETA OF FLIGHT BA 763 IS 16.29 HRS. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD CHECK THAT ETA IS IN FACT AS STATED IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

M.E.D.

P.U.S.D.

MR PARSONS

MR ROSE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 312 OF 04 AUGUST 1973.

64 - YOUR TEL NO 218. SAADOUN GHAI DAN.
YOU ARE CORRECT. ETA IS 1620.

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PUSD
MR PARSONS
MR ROSE

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Reference

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| RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 10 AUG 1973 NKR 1/2 |
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Mr Burton

Mr Smith o/r

CALL ON IRAQI MINISTER OF INTERIOR

1. As you know, General Saadoun Ghaidan, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, finally arrived in London over the weekend and was admitted to University College Hospital (under the pseudonym of Mr Hassan) at the beginning of this week. Mr Parsons called on him at the hospital yesterday evening and I accompanied him. Also present were Mr Al Khoja, the Head of the Iraqi Interests Section in London (whom I had not previously met), and one other Iraqi, presumably one of General Ghaidan's security escorts.

2. The conversation started in English but in view of General Ghaidan's admission that he found some difficulty with the language, we soon switched to Arabic. General Ghaidan started the conversation by expressing thanks for the way in which the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had agreed to his visit here and to the protection which was being accorded him. He gave us an account of the incidents on 30 June, including the assassination of General Shihab and the escape and subsequent arrest of Kazzar. He described his own wounding as having resulted in paralysis of his right arm, but was able to move his fingers slightly. He is to undergo an operation today.

3. Mr Parsons expressed his condolences at the death of General Shihab whom he recalled having met in London 2 years ago. Mr Parsons went on to say that in spite of the absence of diplomatic relations between our two countries, there appeared to be a considerable degree of interchange between us, including commercial activity. General Ghaidan agreed and commented in particular on the continuing presence of a large number of Iraqi students in this country (Mr Al Khoja interjected that there were about 4,000 here at present) and on the presence of Iraqi officers at British training establishments. He recalled his own time of training in the British Army and his service as an officer with a Scottish regiment in Detmold.

4. There then followed a discussion on the question of diplomatic relations. General Ghaidan argued that the British Government had not yet acknowledged the degree to which the Iraqis had changed "since 1944" and claimed that the British past policy on Palestine had created misunderstandings between the British and the Arabs. As we knew, the immediate cause for the break in diplomatic relations in 1971 had been the Islands question, and it would be necessary for Britain to show

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a change in her policy before relations could be resumed. He pointed out that the French had succeeded in changing their image from that of enemy in 1956 to one of friendship now.

5. Mr Parsons pointed out that there had been a considerable development in British Middle East policy over the past years and that the Iraqis should also recognise that there had been changes in Britain. They had only to ask the Egyptians or the Syrians whether this was so. In the case of Syria, diplomatic relations had been resumed and we expected to exchange Ambassadors within the next month or so. So far as the Islands were concerned, Mr Parsons reminded General Ghaidan that Britain had withdrawn from the Gulf and that this was presumably welcome to Iraq. He reminded the General of the Arab saying that "what is past is dead". The General laughed.

6. General Ghaidan did not at any time suggest what specific action was required in order to achieve resumption of diplomatic relations beyond repeating that Britain and Iraq should consider their "joint interests" and that it was necessary to achieve a "change in the conditions" of our relationship.

7. General Ghaidan had nothing of interest to say about the internal situation in Iraq beyond commenting predictably that the situation had swiftly returned to normal after the events of 30 June and that the economic situation was flourishing.

8. The call lasted for $\frac{1}{2}$ hr. In reply to Mr Parsons' question, General Ghaidan said that it was up to the doctors to decide how long he should be here, but he expected to be here until early next month. Mr Parsons indicated that he might be in touch with him again on his return from leave at the end of August.



P R H Wright
Middle East Department

8 August 1973

cc: Mr Parsons
PUSD

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|----------------|
| RTT 10 IN |
| R GITRY No. 35 |
| 10 SEP 1973 |
| NBR1/2 |

We discussed. I think you should

Mr. Parsons

(a) inform Mr. McElhenny & Sir P. Ramoobhan
and (b) do a short report for Ministers
& the PUS

minute
enter + p.a.
5/8

GENERAL GHaidan, IRAQI MINISTER OF INTERIOR

(66) - 1. Mr Wright mentioned in his minute of 8 August, recording your call on General Ghaidan, that you hoped to get in touch with General Ghaidan again on your return from leave. The Iraqi Interests Section rang me on 23 August to say that General Ghaidan had left hospital and was intending to fly back to Iraq on Monday, 27 August. In your and Mr Wright's absence, I arranged a call on General Ghaidan on 24 August. Mr Young accompanied me.

2. We called on General Ghaidan at the Iraqi Ambassador's Residence in Kensington Palace Gardens. Mr Al Khoja, the Head of the Iraqi Interests Section, was also present.

3. General Ghaidan expressed his deep appreciation of the help which we and the Home Office had given him and of the treatment which he had received in hospital. He said that British doctors were, without doubt, the best in the world. His operation had been successful, some movement had been restored to his injured arm, and he expected to make rapid progress to a complete recovery. He would be returning to England in 2 months' time for a check-up.

4. I explained that both you and Mr Wright were on leave. I said I knew that you were hoping to see him again before he left England and to raise again with him the question of diplomatic relations between our two countries. We then went over the same ground that you covered during your meeting on 8 August (he referred to your quoting the Arab saying, "What is past is dead"). He said he would report back to the Revolutionary Command Council, but, when I reminded him that diplomatic procedure dictated that, as Iraq had broken off relations with us, it was of course for them to make the first move, he would not accept this, saying that it was up to us first to remove the reason for their breaking off relations with us. He then referred to past British policy on Palestine and our giving away Arab land to the Iranians in 1971. However, he expressed pleasure at our recent performance in the Security Council on the Israeli "air piracy" and looked forward to the day that full diplomatic relations between our two countries could be resumed.

5. I said that we had noted with satisfaction that His Excellency Saddam Hussain, in a recent press interview, had said that he would like to see an improvement in our relations and I assured General Ghaidan that any move towards a resumption of relations by the Iraqi Government would be sympathetically considered by HMG.

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6. General Ghaidan again expressed his thanks to all concerned and said that he looked forward to seeing you again when he returned to London in two months time.

7. I checked with the Iraqi Interests Section this morning that General Ghaidan had left without trouble on 27 August. Mr Khalil (Third Secretary) said that everything had gone smoothly and General Ghaidan was most grateful for the arrangements made.



R M Hunt
Middle East Department

28 August 1973

cc: PUSD
Mr Smith

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R E S T R I C T E D

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| RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 29 AUG 1973 NBR 1/2 |
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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 323 OF 28 AUGUST 1973.
MY TEL NO 312. SAADOUN GHAI DAN.

GENERAL GHAI DAN RETURNED TO BAGHDAD ON
BOAC FLIGHT FROM LONDON LAST NIGHT. HE
WAS SWINGING BOTH ARMS.

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MR PARSONS
MR ROSE

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Al Taakhi newspaper of 19 August 1973 issued a statement by the Kurdish Democratic Party on the recent bilateral agreement reached between the Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi Communist Party over the National Charter.

The statement says that the Agreement of the 11 th of March for the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish problem concluded between the Baath Party and the KDP constituted a great historical achievement on the road of national unity. Agreement was reached between representatives of the two parties, after the conclusion of the March Agreement, over the issue of a National Charter collectively by the two parties. However, the Baath Party did not abide by this Agreement. It drew up a draft Charter and announced it individually on 15 November 1971 in spite of the fact that the KDP preferred the draft to be drawn up by all the parties concerned. In spite of this, the KDP submitted a Memorandum to the Baath Party on 12 January 1972, on the latter's request, embodying the viewpoint of the KDP on the draft Charter, but has not yet received a reply. Bilateral meetings that took place between the Baath Party and the Iraqi Communist Party for reaching an agreement over the draft National Charter which culminated in the Agreement of the 17th of July. In appreciating the importance of the said bilateral Agreement and admitting the freedom of all national parties to take such action as conformed with their viewpoints and the national interest and also their right to enter into special agreements between them, the KDP find it necessary to point out that the circumstances which surround the bilateral agreement and the fact that the KDP were not acquainted with it sufficiently before its announcement have assisted in creating a condition which may be interpreted as the existence of a desire on the parties which reached the Agreement to put the KDP in a critical condition, place it before an accomplished fact and bring pressure to bear upon it for adopting a specified attitude towards the Bloc. The draft National Charter upon which the KDP had commented has, under the new Agreement, been revised in a manner which cannot be considered as a step forward from the viewpoint of the KDP, excluding that of

deleting the paragraph which linked between the exercise of its national right by the Kurdish people and the necessity of its believing that Iraq was a part of the Arab nation. There is a noteworthy point in the Internal Regulations of the Bloc. Article 2 of the Regulations provided that the Central Committee of the Bloc shall be composed of 16 members, including the Chairman, as follows: 8 members to be seconded by the Baath Party, 3 members to be seconded by the KDP, 3 members to be seconded by the Iraqi CP, one member from the Independent Democrats and one member from the Progressive Nationalists. Although the KDP had general observations to make concerning this distribution of seats within the Bloc, the KDP believe that the peculiar circumstances of the KDP were not taken into consideration in the distribution of seats, in view of the fact that the KDP represented the second race in the country, a fact which has been admitted by several parties within and outside Iraq, including the Baath Party.

The KDP aspire that the nationalist party should look upon the KDP not only as a political party but as being a party representing the aims and aspirations of the Kurdish party which is leading its movements for liberation.

Some are demanding the KDP to expedite its entry into the Bloc and to work within its frame for the solution of outstanding problems including the implementation of the remaining clauses of the March Agreement and the achievement of self-government within its time limit, the month of March next year. The KDP is not inclined to support this view and consider it necessary that an agreement must be reached in advance over the general bases and principles of the present obstacles and joint action with the parties of the Bloc. The KDP is anxious that the Bloc should exist on plain and strong bases from the beginning and must avoid its downfall in the future. One of the basic factors which led to the cracking of the March Agreement is the fact that no complete and detailed form was agreed upon over certain clauses of the Agreement at the time in view of the feverish desire of the Arab and Kurdish masses and parties that the Agreement should be announced to the people hurriedly and the existence of vital points which were not studied in detail or agreed upon frankly. These vital points continue to be

outstanding between the KDP and the Baath Party and must be studied afresh with a view to reaching solutions therefor. These points may be confined to the following:-

1. Agreement must be reached on carrying out a census population. This was provided for in the March Agreement. A date must be determined for this, preliminary to determining the districts to be covered by self-government. The effects of the policy of "Arabianisation" exercised by the authorities in certain districts of Kurdistan, such as Kirkuk, Khaniqin, Mandali and Sinjar, must also disappear.
2. Agreement must be reached on the form of self-government to be enjoyed by the Kurdish people during the period determined in the March Agreement which is due to expire in the beginning of March next. The KDP had already submitted its proposals for self-government a few months ago to the Baath party, on the request of the latter, and has not yet received a frank reply conveying the viewpoint of the Baath Party.
3. The attitude of the Baath Party must be determined vis-a-vis the observations made by the KDP over the draft National Charter in the Memorandum submitted by the KDP on 12 January 1972.
4. Action must be taken to terminate the transitional period and the carrying out of free elections in the country one year after the entry of the KDP into the Bloc, in lieu of the period of two years suggested in paragraph 2 of the KDP's above mentioned Memorandum, due to the lapse of over 1½ years over the submission of the Memorandum and the fact that termination of the transitional period has become a public demand.

The recent unsuccessful attempt made by Nadhim Kzar and his clique stresses the legitimacy of the KDP demands and convince it that a return to constitutional life and the termination of the abnormal conditions and the transitional period are a good safeguard for any agreement to be concluded by parties of the national movements.

In looking forward to the acceptance of these points by the Baath Party and the Iraqi CP and other nationalist parties and expressing its readiness to complete the dialogue between them and co-operate for reaching a positive agreement over them, the KDP states that it will comply with the clauses of the March Agreement reached between it and the Baath Party and will maintain close ties with the parties sharing in the Bloc according to the requirements of the interests of the people and the country. The KDP also considers that the dialogue will achieve success and that the KDP will take its natural place in the Nationalist and Progressive Bloc which will serve as the sharp weapon of the people for achieving more gains and victories.

The statement is signed by the Politbureau of the KDP and dated the Middle of August 1973.

Reference

NBR 1/2
(d1973)

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- already entered at 67

Translation of
Statement issued by the KDP.

With the compliments of

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
British Interests Section
BAGHDAD

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| RECEIVED IN | |
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| - 3 SEP 1973 | |
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23 August 1973

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TO ROUTINE STOCKHOLM TELEGRAM NO. 114 OF 7 SEPTEMBER, 1973

GENERAL SA'ADOUN GHAIIDAN: IRAQI MINISTER OF INTERIOR

1. FOLLOWING THE RECENT ABORTIVE COUP IN IRAQ, IN WHICH GENERAL GHAIIDAN WAS WOUNDED, WE WERE ASKED FOR PERMISSION FOR HIM TO VISIT BRITAIN FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT.

2. GENERAL GHAIIDAN HAS RECENTLY RETURNED TO IRAQ AFTER A 3 WEEK STAY IN LONDON DURING WHICH PARSONS CALLED ON HIM IN HOSPITAL AND HUNT OF MED VISITED HIM AGAIN BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. THE SUBJECT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WAS DISCUSSED. ON BOTH OCCASIONS THE RESULT WAS NEGATIVE, GHAIIDAN TAKING THE LINE THAT IT WAS FOR US TO REMOVE THE REASON FOR WHICH THE IRAQIS MADE THE BREAK, IE THE GULF ISLANDS ISSUE.

3. PROVIDED YOU SEE NO OBJECTION, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD INFORM THE SWEDISH MFA OF THE ABOVE AND SAY THAT IN OUR VIEW THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT AT PRESENT OF A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS, THOUGH WE THINK THAT WE MAY HAVE GAINED SOME CREDIT IN OUR TREATMENT OF GHAIIDAN. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT GHAIIDAN IS INTENDING TO RETURN TO BRITAIN FOR A MEDICAL CHECK-UP IN TWO MONTHS WHEN WE SHALL CALL ON HIM AGAIN. IF ANYTHING RESULTS WE SHALL LET THE SWEDES KNOW.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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MR PARSONS

*rsb/19
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01- 930 8440 Ext 664

Your reference

T Fitzgerald Esq
Immigration & Nationality Dept
Home Office
Whitehall, SW1

Our reference NBR 1/2

Date 10 September 1973

LT GEN SA'ADOUN GHaidan

1. I am sure you will recall the case of the Iraqi Minister of the Interior who, in July, requested permission to visit Britain for medical treatment for the injuries he received during the abortive coup attempt on 30 June.
2. Now that I have returned from leave, I should like to place on record my gratitude to your Department for the co-operation we received over the arrangements for the visit. I am particularly grateful for the efforts of Superintendent Lambert of Special Branch who co-ordinated the arrangements for the Minister's protection whilst in London.
3. You may care to know that, as we had expected, the visit passed off without incident and that General Ghaidan left London full of praise for Britain's medical facilities and the arrangements that had been made for him here. I should add that General Ghaidan has told us that he may need to return for a further check-up in about 2 months time.

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

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Wright

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone Q1-

R W Renwick Esq
British Embassy
PARIS

Your reference

Our reference NBR 1/2

Date 13 September 1973

Copy on NBR 3/548/1

UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

1. Following the abortive coup in Iraq in July, in which General Sa'adoun Ghaidan, the Minister of the Interior, was wounded, we were asked for permission for him to visit Britain for medical Treatment.
2. We agreed to the request and General Ghaidan came here from 6-27 August. During his visit Tony Parsons and Patrick Wright called on him in hospital and I saw him again before his departure. On both occasions, during which Ghaidan received us cordially, the subject of relations between our two countries was discussed Ghaidan stuck firmly to the line that it was for us to remove the reason which caused the Iraqis to make the break in 1971 ie the Gulf Islands issue.
3. Provided you see no objection I should be grateful if you would inform the Quai of the above and say that in our view there is little prospect at present of a resumption of diplomatic relations although we think that we may have gained some credit in our treatment of Ghaidan. You should add that Ghaidan is intending to return to Britain for a further check-up in about two months' time when we shall call on him again. If anything results we shall of course let you know.
4. I am copying this letter to Bill Sharpe in Kuwait with reference to Patrick Wright's letter of 26 July to the Ambassador. I do not think that we need to take the initiative by telling the Kuwaitis anything more about Ghaidan's visit: if however they ask I think that we should confine our reply to the contents of para 2 above.
5. I am also copying this letter to Tony Reeve in Washington; I have already mentioned Ghaidan's visit to George Lambrakis.

c.c. W Sharpe OBE
KUWAIT
A Reeve
WASHINGTON

R M Hunt
Middle East Department


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ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
British Interests Section
BAGHDAD



SB 24/9

SB 27/9
pe

GS Burton Esq
Middle East Department
Foreign & Commonwealth Office

Your reference

Our reference

Date 22 September 1973

Dear Graham,

I am without a confidential typist today, so I hope you will excuse some longhand letters for the bag.

Violence in Baghdad: There has been some unexplained violence in Baghdad during the summer which has left the city very jumpy. Following the murder in early June in Mansour of the wife and servant of an ex Ottoman Bank manager, the wife + daughter of an Armenian doctor were murdered in Kadat Mariam, and an Army family in Police City. There are rumours of masked men being seen, and other reports of violence in the town. The Moroccan 1st Secretary was hit on the arm by an intruder with an axe.

2. In a town where violence is seldom reported, the official admission that these crimes have taken place has worried the middle class Baghdadi, and the foreign resident. Most people sleep on the roof during the summer, and are thus more likely to be alert to the sounds of the night.

3. However, leaving aside the possibility that this is pure thuggery, there are two possible political motives which are current. Firstly the Government may be trying to eliminate or frighten into submission some of the opposition which lay behind

behind the Gzar group. Alternatively undiscovered elements of that group may be trying to create an atmosphere which will lead to lack of confidence in the Government and its security machine. The dissidents could also come from Kurdish or other groups unhappy with the proposed National Front - there has been a surge of open Kurdish defiance during the summer

However there have been no new incidents in the last fortnight and colleagues tell me they are hopeful that the crisis period is past.

Our own security arrangements seem adequate though I am considering what improvements might be made. At the Embassy we have a squad of 9 policemen who provide a ^{24 hour} night watch. They are more than usually alert. In the residential areas we rely on the local police. An alarm raised by one policeman in Moscow in August resulted in the Archivist's house being surrounded by a strong armed force within minutes - it was a false alarm but their reaction was encouraging.

Yours ever

Len.

I. McCune

Restricted

GR 83

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD PM280645Z SEPTEMBER

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AMENDED DISTRIBUTION: 28/9/73.

1973

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 353 OF 28 SEPTEMBER INFO IMMEDIATE
TO WASHINGTON STOCKHOLM AND PARIS.

WE UNDERSTAND THAT EARLY THIS MORNING BAGHDAD TELEVISION
ANNOUNCED IMPOSITION OF CURFEW FROM 0600 LOCAL TIME UNTIL
FURTHER NOTICE.

THIS WAS LATER CONFIRMED VERBALLY BY MFA BUT NO REASONS
HAVE BEEN GIVEN.

BAGHDAD RADIO PROGRAMMES ARE RUNNING AS NORMAL AND NO
ANNOUNCEMENT MADE SO FAR.

2.

SITUATION IN BAGHDAD IS QUIET AND A NUMBER OF PEOPLE CAN BE
SEEN ON THE STREETS.

THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO TRAFFIC OTHER THAN POLICE, MILITARY
AND OFFICIAL VEHICLES.

MCCLUNEY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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
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CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 280845Z SEPTEMBER

RESTRICTED

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 354 OF 28 SEPTEMBER 1973
INFO WASHINGTON, PARIS AND STOCKHOLM.



BAGHDAD CURFEW.

MYTEL NO. 353.

A STATEMENT FROM THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR HAS BEEN
READ ON T/V AS FOLLOWS:-

"ANNOUNCEMENT OF CURFEW FROM 0600 UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.
THESE MEASURES ARE BEING TAKEN AS A RESULT OF RECENT
INCIDENTS AND IN ORDER TO APPREHEND "SABOTEURS".
THE GOVERNMENT IS SETTING UP COMMITTEES TO INVESTIGATE
THESE INCIDENTS AND THE PEOPLE ARE ASKED TO BE ON THE
LOOKOUT FOR SUSPECTS".

(THE INCIDENTS REFERRED TO ARE UNEXPLAINED MURDERS)

2.

THE POLICE HAVE TOLD US THEY ARE CARRYING OUT SECURITY
CHECKS IN THE MANSOUR AREA AND STAFF HAVE BEEN ASKED TO
COOPERATE AND REPORT ANY INCIDENTS.
WE SHALL KEEP A SKELETON STAFF IN THE OFFICE TILL
FURTHER NOTICE.

3.

TELEPHONES ARE OPERATING NORMALLY.
I AM IN CONTACT WITH SWEDISH AMBASSADOR.
GRATEFUL IF STOCKHOLM COULD PASS PARA 1
TO MFA STOCKHOLM AS HE WILL NOT OPEN HIS RADIO LINK
TODAY.

/4. I AM

RESTRICTED

4.

I AM IN TOUCH WITH LOURIE, US INTERESTS.

GRATEFUL IF WASHINGTON COULD PASS PARA 1 TO STATE DEPARTMENT.

5.

GRATEFUL IF PARIS COULD ENSURE QUAI D'ORSAY ARE AWARE
OF CURFEW.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

MCCLUNEY

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PRIORITY

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RESTRICTED

1973

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 355 OF 28 SEPTEMBER INFO PRIORITY
TO PARIS WASHINGTON STOCKHOLM BEIRUT KUWAIT AND TEHERAN.

BAGHDAD CURFEW. BACKGROUND.

THERE HAS BEEN A GROWING UNEASINESS IN BAGHDAD FOR TWO MONTHS
NOW, CENTRED ON A SERIES OF MURDERS REPORTED IN THE PRESS
(MY LETTER OF 22 SEPTEMBER TO BURTON). IT IS OF
COURSE QUITE UNUSUAL FOR CRIME TO BE REPORTED HERE AT ALL.

8. AL THAWRA OF 16 SEPTEMBER PUBLISHED SPECULATIVE
ARTICLE DISCOUNTING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE MURDERERS WERE
MENTALLY DERANGED AND SUGGESTING THAT THEY WERE A " GROUP
OF CRIMINALS WORKING FOR A PARTY HOSTILE TO THE REVOLUTION
TO SPREAD CHAOS AND FEAR AND SHAKE THE CONFIDENCE BETWEEN
THE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT " IN SUPPORT OF THIS VIEW
AL THAWRA ARGUES THAT MURDER OF POLITICAL FIGURES WOULD
HAVE A LIMITED EFFECT ON THE PUBLIC, AND IMMEDIATELY REVEAL
THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF THE CRIMINALS.

3. THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO CONNECT THE GROUP OF CRIMINALS
WITH IMPERIALISTS AND ZIONISTS (SOUQ RUMOUR SUGGESTS
THIS IS MOST LIKELY TO MEAN IRANIANS IN THIS CONTEXT).

4. IT WAS ANNOUNCED TEN DAYS AGO THAT FOREIGN EXPERTS HAVE
BEEN CALLED IN TO CATCH THE CRIMINALS, POPULAR RUMOUR IS THAT
THESE ARE FROM SCOTLAND YARD, BUT I HAVE DENIED
KNOWLEDGE OF THIS .

RESTRICTED

/5.

5. SADDAM HUSSEIN - IN A SPEECH ON MONDAY 24 SEPTEMBER SAID THAT 'THE RECENT CRIMES WERE COMMITTED BY TRAITOROUS AGENTS AND DESIGNED TO WEAR DOWN THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. IMPERIALISM HAS LAUNCHED AN OFFENSIVE AND IS TRYING TO GIVE ITS AGENTS AND OTHER UNCOMMITTED PEOPLE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS FEEBLE. THE ABSENCE OF NADHIM GAZR AND HIS SECURITY ORGANISATION DOES NOT LEAVE OPEN TO IMPERIALIST AGENTS THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISTURB THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY'.

6. IT IS RUMOURED THIS MORNING THAT SOME CRIMINALS WERE CAUGHT LAST NIGHT AND AN ATTEMPT IS BEING MADE NOW TO CATCH THE REST. HOWEVER TODAY, BEING A FRIDAY AND THE SECOND DAY OF RAMADAN, IT IS QUITE A CONVENIENT DAY FOR CURFEW. VERY LITTLE DISRUPTION OF NORMAL LIFE WILL OCCUR.

7. IT SEEMS MOST LIKELY THAT THE CURFEW IS SIMPLY TO SHOW THE STRENGTH OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PUT THE MINDS OF PEOPLE AT REST ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY IN THE CAPITAL

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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 356 OF 29 SEPTEMBER
INFO WASHINGTON, PARIS AND STOCKHOLM.

BAGHDAD CURFEW.

A STATEMENT FROM THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR
WAS BROADCAST ON BAGHDAD TELEVISION AT 0700
LOCAL TIME STATING CURFEW WOULD BE LIFTED AT
0800 LOCAL TODAY.

MCCLUNEY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
MED

M.O.D. INT.

G Burton Esq,
Middle East Dept
FCO
London SW1



79

With the compliments of
THE COMMERCIAL SECRETARIAT

Ente

**British Interests Section
Royal Swedish Embassy**

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

BAGHDAD

1
3 September 1973

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With the compliments of
THE COMMERCIAL SECRETARIAT

BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

NATIONAL FRONT ISSUES HANDOUT

RENEWS INVITATION TO KDP

The High Committee of the Progressive National Front on Saturday evening released a handout on the first meeting the committee held on Tuesday under the chairmanship of Comrade Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Secretary-General of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and the committee's Chairman.

The handout stressed the importance of the emergence of the progressive national and nationalist Front and described this as a historic event expressing the will for good among our people and their national forces.

The High Committee adopted a number of principles concerning the Front's forward advance and called upon all militant strugglers of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and of the Iraqi Communist Party as well as all progressive patriots and nationalists to shoulder their responsibilities under the Front's principles and leave nothing undone to defend the revolutionary regime and its gains.

The Committee decided to renew the invitation to the Kurdistan Democratic Party to join the Front and participate in the national activities, stemming from the conviction that coalition work is the right platform for dealing with all problems of the homeland:

Present at the meeting were representatives of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, namely, Comrades Saddam Hussein, Izat al-Douri, Izat Mustafa, Naem Haddad, Tariq Aziz and Ghanim Abdul Jalel and representatives of the Iraqi Communist Party, namely, Comrades Aziz Mohammed, Thabit Habib, and Amer Abdullah.

The handout, signed by President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr in his capacity as the Committee's Chairman, is as follows:

"The High Committee of the progressive national and nationalist Front, at 7 o'clock on Tuesday evening August 28, 1973, held its first meeting at the conference room of the Presidential Palace. At the meeting, which continued for more than two hours, the committee affirmed or adopted the following resolutions:

(1) — The emergence of the progressive national and nationalist Front is a historic event expressing the will for good among the people of Iraq and their national forces in respect to cooperation for the fulfillment of the people's aspirations and of their national and nationalist unifications. The emergence of the Front was greeted with universal and profound enthusiasm on the part of the broad masses of the people and all honest and progressive

without, should escalate their plotting on the revolutionary regime and the progressive and democratic gains of the people and accelerate the intrigues designed to belittle the importance of the Front and cast doubts on its utility and effectiveness.

(3) — It is therefore incumbent upon the militant strugglers of the ABSP and the Iraqi CP as well as upon all progressive patriots and nationalists to strain every effort for disseminating and consolidating the spirit of coalition in all spheres and pursue effective methods, based on coalition principles, for resolving all problems that might arise in the future and close all loopholes through which the machinations of the forces of imperialism and reaction might wriggle their way.

(4) — The country's rule, having become, on the emergence of the Front, the responsibility of the progressive national and nationalist Front (where all parties to the Front, side by side with the ABSP, bear joint responsibility) militant strugglers of the two Parties and all progressive national and nationalist elements should conduct themselves in this spirit and work by all means at their disposal to defend the revolutionary regime and the democratic and progressive gains secured to the people and exert all positive efforts to consolidate the advance of the revolution and realize more gains.

(5) — The Committee resolved at its meeting to renew the call on the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to join the Front and participate in its organs and national positive activities, on the profound conviction that coalition work is

the right framework for approaching all problems facing the homeland and having such problems solved in a manner assuring to national interests and to the rights of the people as a whole.

(6) — The Committee further resolved to resume consultations with progressive national and nationalist elements with the object of securing their affiliation in the High Committee and in the Front's organs and set the way for their participation in various spheres of coalition work.

(7) — The Committee studied at its meeting the basic principles of the self-rule plan to our Kurdish people in the area populated by a Kurdish majority on the basis of the March Manifesto and decided to go ahead with its discussions on this subject with a view to drawing up, shortly, a coherent plan for submission to the KDP, to progressive national and nationalist forces and to the masses of the people for a free and democratic debate preliminary to its approval in accordance with constitutional formulas so as to have it enforced ahead of the appointed date on March 11, 1974.

(8) — The Committee resolved to form a secretariat to the Front as well as the Baghdad Committee, provincial committees and specialized committees reporting to the secretariat.

(9) — The Committee resolved to set up a headquarters in Baghdad as early as possible.

(10) — It also resolved to prepare a statement in its own name discussing the statement issued in regard to the Front, by the politburo of the KDP as published on August 19, 1973." — INA

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(1) — The emergence of the progressive national and nationalist Front is a historic event expressing the will for good among the people of Iraq and their national forces in respect to cooperation for the fulfillment of the people's aspirations and of their national and nationalist ambitions. The emergence of the Front was greeted with universal and profound enthusiasm on the part of the broad masses of the people and all honest and progressive forces throughout the Arab homeland and the world at large. The High Committee expressed deep thanks and appreciations to Arab and foreign political parties, organizations and personalities who have voiced support for the creation of the Front.

(2) — In view of the importance of this event to the country's life and future, it is quite natural that the imperialistic quarters and the forces of reaction, both within and

without, should escalate their plotting on the revolutionary regime and the progressive and democratic gains of the people and accelerate the intrigues designed to belittle the importance of the Front and cast doubts on its utility and effectiveness.

(3) — It is therefore incumbent upon the militant strugglers of the ABSP and the Iraqi CP as well as upon all progressive patriots and nationalists to strain every effort for disseminating and consolidating the spirit of coalition in all spheres and pursue effective methods, based on coalition principles, for resolving all problems that might arise in the future and close all loopholes through which the machinations of the forces of imperialism and reaction might wriggle their way.

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WORKERS PENSION & SOCIAL SECURITY

PART II

(Due to the importance of Law No. 39 of 1971 and its amendment Law No. 155 of 1971 governing workers pension, the Baghdad Observer started a review of the Law highlighting its significance and analysing most of its articles. We published in our issue of last week (Aug. 27) a prelude on "Labour Ethics"; today to tackle the "legislation of the Law".)

LEGISLATION OF THE LAW

The workers Pension and Social Security Law might be termed as a gift donated by a supreme authority to the ever-growing working class of Iraq. This concept is, in fact, an outcome of superficial outlook, for the Workers Pension and Social Security Law, Labour Law, and End-of-Service Law are among the legislations which have culminated the interaction of two ideological concepts through which the Iraqi people displayed impressive aspects of staunch determination


and bitter fight to attain the interests of the working class and change its position exclusively. They have embodied a genuine response to the basic demands of the working class against the violations committed by employers of their rights.

The first concept is represented in the ABSP struggle and projects into the problems of the oppressed masses of the people, coupled with its nationalist fight to bring about appropriate conditions for the elimination of all aspects of imperialist domination. These in-

clude economic domination over natural resources and rendering national markets an exclusive outlet for European products. This was aimed at the creation of a semi-qualified working class to undertake negligible assignments in the fields of oil, mining and business activities, thus precluding the possibility of enhancing such an extensive experience as would develop the fields of specialized technical-industrial production.

The nationalist struggle of the Baath is the fight against the forces which encroached on the nationalist interest all over the Arab Homeland including Iraq; hence the ideological coordination between the Arab Homeland including Iraq; hence the ideological coordination between the Arab revolutionary concept and the practical implementation in Iraq.

The second concept, basically related to the personal approach of workers, is the working class's attitude towards workers' daily requirements and unwarranted demands and their passive attitude towards self-determination and production operations; hence the ignorance of the relationship between various stages of production,



position in the production ladder, so as to undertake direct responsibility of national production and secure a bright future for the forthcoming generations; hence the unprecedented expansion of health and economic services.

MOTIVES BEHIND THE LAW

The Baath revolution in Iraq believes in socialism as a strategy and tactic. It is the sole regime that can provide, in a

(Continued on page 12)

STATE ORGANISATION FOR TEXTILE INDUSTRIES

MOSUL STATE COMPANY FOR TEXTILE

MOSUL — IRAQ

Tender 565/26/73 for the supply of

30 Nos. Dobbies for Weaving Looms.

1— This Company invites all tenderers who are registered in the Chamber of Commerce & hold a certificate of Income Tax for this year to participate in the abovementioned tender according to

NOTICE

STATE ORGANISATION FOR TEXTILE INDUSTRIES

FINE TEXTILE STATE COMPANY

HILLA — IRAQ

For: We herewith renew advertising our tender No. 29/73 to supply spare parts for Northop 100ms MT 48"

MOSUL — IRAQ

Tender 565/26/73 for the supply of 30 Nos. Dobbies for Weaving Looms.

1— This Company invites all tenderers who are registered in the Chamber of Commerce & hold a certificate of Income Tax for this year to participate in the abovementioned tender according to the terms & technical specifications which could be obtained from the Purchase Dept. at this Company or from the Foreign Purchase Department — State Establishment for Textile Industries, Bank Street — Baghdad, against payment of one Dinar (ID. 1/-) per copy, unrefundable.

2 — All offers to be submitted in sealed envelopes marked with name & No. of the Tender to this Company not later than 11-10-1973 accompanied with a deposit not exceeding 5% of the cost value, and any offer reaches this Company after the specified date will be neglected.

3 — This Company does not bind itself to accept the lowest or any other offer.

4 — Offers not complying with our conditions and terms will be neglected.

5 — This Company is to stipulate to the tenderers who are submitting their offers, the producing goods should not be for companies who have branches in Israel and not black listed.

Eng. SAADY IBRAHIM
Director General

Baghdad Observer No. 1702, Dated 3/9/1973.

No. 10098

between the Arab revolutionary concept and the practical implementation in Iraq.

The second concept, basically related to the personal approach of workers, is the working class's attitude towards workers' daily requirements and unwarranted demands and their passive attitude towards self-determination and production operations; hence the ignorance of the relationship between various stages of production.

Apparently the daily demands of workers and their unionist struggle in various fields of activity were relationship between the worker and employer is at odds, have not assumed a purely unionist approach, but developed a political essence, due to the attempts on the part of employers to provoke reactionary regimes against the working class on the one hand, and the resort on the part of the working class to their revolutionary leader party; hence the cohesion between the party and masses, on the other.

This has practically led to the solid ideological cohesion of Arab Baath Socialist Party and the working class, as reflected in many an aspect of the fruitful cooperation.

During the phase of underground struggle, the Party staunchly defended workers' interests, contributed to their strikes and demonstrations and sponsored their demands. It undertook highlighting their interests through its clandestine pamphlets and publications.

Following its assumption of power in Iraq, the Party resolved to carry out a radical change in the relationship between the worker and employer by means of changing the former's

FINE TEXTILE STATE COMPANY

HILLA — IRAQ

For: We herewith renew advertising our tender
No. 29/73 to supply spare parts for Northop
100ms MT 48"

1. The F.T.S.C. invites all tenderers who are registered in the Chamber of Commerce and hold a certificate from Income Tax office to participate in the above tender. The general terms and conditions can be obtained from the Branch Bureau of this Company — Su'adoun street Baghdad or from the main office in Hilla against payment of (ID. 1/-) unrefundable.

2. All offers are to be submitted in sealed envelopes, marked clearly with the name and number of the tender and addressed to (Fine Textile Company in Hilla) not later than 12.00 o'clock of 24/9/1973.

3. The F.T.S.C. does not bind itself to accept the lowest or any other tender

4. Tenders not complying with our terms and conditions will be neglected.

5. A cash deposit or bank guarantee of 5% of the value should be submitted in a sealed and marked envelope.

Foreign tenderers who have no representatives in Iraq are exempted from Para (1) above.

Zuhair Al-Doori

Director General

Baghdad Observer No. 1702, Dated 3/9/1973.

10090

THE NATIONAL ACTION CHARTER

A — OIL AND MINERALS:

At the present phase, oil is the basic resource of the country's economy, and performs a decisive role in determining its political and economic future. As a result of this exceptional importance of oil in our life, the foreign monopolist companies have played dangerous roles in jeopardising the country's independence, and conspiring against its patriotic and progressive forces, and against the people's aspirations for freedom and progress. Naturally, following the nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and the possession of the Mosul Oil Company, the aim of the revolution is the completion of the full liberation of the oil wealth from foreign control and exploitation, its subjection to national sovereignty in all aspects, its full placement in the service of the people's welfare, and its turning into a decisive instrument of struggle against imperialism and Zionism. The serious and scientific work for achieving these aims, requires the continued procedure, resolutely and consistently, along the national oil policy followed by the revolution, and aimed at building a large, strong and integrated oil industry.

The task of building the na-

B — THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION:

The revolution shoulders the responsibility of effecting a radical change in the whole political, economic, social and cultural foundations and relationships in favour of the movement for liberation and progress. The countryside and the agricultural sector are among the chief sectors in need of swift and decisive change, because of its miserable and backward conditions, comprising as it does the greatest sector of the people.

Our countryside is in need of a universal revolution, which would eliminate the feudal, tribal and communal relationships and all the backward values inherited from the centuries of enslavement and disseminated by the backward exploitative feudal system. The radical agrarian reform started by the revolution in the countryside, is only the beginning for the agrarian revolution which would deliver the countryside from its backward conditions.

The accomplishment of radical agrarian reform, with the aim of effecting an all-out agrarian revolution, requires continuation of the measures taken by the revolution to liquidate the feudal properties, distribute the land among the peasants and provide them with

land. The imperialists and their local allies had tried to obstruct the rise of a strong and vigorous national industry for two basic reasons; first, maintenance of the backward conditions in our country and keeping the latter as a market for circulating the goods manufactured in the imperialist countries and a source of raw materials for the imperialist monopolies; and secondly, prevention of the formation of a big working class. When the national will and the objective conditions imposed the establishment of a national industry, they tried by various methods to keep it dependent on the imperialist market and restrict it to the supplementary and consumer fields.

At present the revolution faces two big tasks in the field of industry; first, completion, bringing to success, development and extension of the present industries; and secondly, the building of a modern, large, diversified, coordinated, and integrated national industrial base, which would be a prop to national independence and a basis for political, economic and social development, oriented towards socialism, since industry in the Iraqi region is mainly based on two important mainstays, namely oil and agriculture; it is natural that the industrialisation process should be directed towards the attainment of mutual interconnection between this process and the two aforementioned mainstays.



The task of building a strong national industry capable of performing its tasks in our patriotic and nationalist battles on one hand, and bringing prosperity to the masses on the other, requires the creation of a sound balance between heavy and productive industries (without which it is impossible to lay the bases for an independent and strong national industry) on one hand, and the consumer industries which meet the citizens' needs, together with great care for increasing the development rates, raising the labour productivity, curtailing the costs, improvement and increase of production, opposing all trends for sweeping al-

planning organs, the increase of industrial schools and institutes, and the utilisation of all the national and Arab experience and the experience and aid of the socialist and friendly countries.

D — TRADE

The trade sector occupies a position of utmost importance, due to its basic connection with the question of national development and national independence on one hand, and its being the sector responsible for ensuring the consumers needs of the people on the other.

The line which should be followed in trade policy, is the

these aims, requires the continued procedure, resolutely and consistently, along the national oil policy followed by the revolution, and aimed at building a large, strong and integrated oil industry.

The task of building the national oil industry requires the bolstering of this sector by all the necessary material and human resources, the development of the institutes and institutions providing the cadres needed by the oil industry, and cooperation with the socialist and friendly countries. The Charter stresses the need for continuation of the policy of wrenching out the rest of our rights from the monopolist companies, whether through work via the Arab and international organisations, or through the measures and legislations enacted by the state. Chief among the aims of the policy, the planning of production, and its placement in the service of our national interests, and also increasing the oil prices and the revenues. Continuing the same line in the field of oil policy, the Charter attaches great importance to the continued direct national exploitation of minerals.

The oil resources are the main source of energy in Iraq and the primary source of capital and its accumulation. At the same time, it is the raw material of the oil and petrochemical industries. The rational use of oil and its revenues would form a basic foundation for economic development, which requires in turn the merging of oil and the oil industries in the national economy.

The building of a large mineral industry is a basic element in the process of building a diversified and integrated national economy which would achieve progress and enable the country to fully control the destinies of its economy and place them in the service of its interests and its national and pan-Arab causes.

The accomplishment of radical agrarian reform, with the aim of effecting an all-out agrarian revolution, requires continuation of the measures taken by the revolution to liquidate the feudal properties, distribute the land among the peasants and provide them with seeds, fertilisers and loans, accomplish major irrigation and drainage projects, and development of the present ones; increase the area of the cultivated land while concentrating on vertical expansion in agriculture by the employment of machines and improved seeds, carry out the necessary changes in the agricultural structure; and show concern for the livestock, agricultural industrialisation and planned exploitation production and marketing.

It also requires the generalisation of universal enlightenment, preparation of the material conditions for stopping the emigration from countryside to towns, and continued encouragement of the educated youth to work in the countryside. Among the basic needs for effecting the required revolutionary changes in the countryside, are the combating of illiteracy among the peasants, introduction of agriculture as a fundamental subject in education, generalisation of agricultural schools and institutes, and the establishment of specialised institutes and laboratories for agricultural sciences.

The sound and advanced framework for effecting the agrarian revolution, raising the living standards of the peasant masses, and increasing production in keeping with the requirements of the national economy, are the state, collective and cooperative forms, which the revolution is working to generalise throughout the whole countryside.

C — INDUSTRY:

Industry is the main basis of the process of civilisational progress at our present times, and one of the basic prerequisites for transition to social-

mainstays, namely oil and agriculture; it is natural that the industrialisation process should be directed towards the attainment of mutual interconnection between this process and the two aforementioned mainstays.

The basic tasks of industrialisation in our country are the establishment and development of the petro-chemical and mining industries, and of industries dependent on the agricultural materials produced by the country. This also requires the establishment of industries providing the oil and minerals and agricultural sectors with the required implements and equipment.



pendent and strong national industry) on one hand, and the consumer industries which meets the citizens' needs, together with great care for increasing the development rates, raising the labour productivity, curtailing the costs, improvement and increase of production, opposing all trends for sweeping along the slippery path of consumer economy, and linking up the immediate and ultimate economic objectives. One of the basic conditions accompanying the all-out industrialisation process, is the extension of the power industry, and particularly the high-tension electrical power.

The Public Sector in industry is the basis; it shoulders the responsibility for leading the private and mixed sectors, and the revolution should bolster this sector by all the required resources, and extend it to the maximum. In view of the country's need for rapid development and for the citizens' participation in the construction process, the participation of the Private Sector in the industrial plans, and particularly the consumer and small supplementary industries, is very necessary, and should be encouraged by the state and provided with all the requisites and guarantees of success.


Moreover, the work for extending democratic management in the industrial and productive enterprises, by means of extending the workers' participation in the managing boards and the general assemblies of the establishments, in a manner ensuring the increase and development of production and the establishment of sound and conscious labour relationships, is one of the aims sought after by the revolution and ensuring for the country conscious, loyal and active cadres for leading this vital sector. The accomplishment of these tasks requires the development of the organs of the Public Sector in industrial schools and institutes,

the question of national development and national independence on one hand, and its being the sector responsible for ensuring the consumers needs of the people on the other.

The line which should be followed in trade policy, is the subjection of domestic and foreign trade to the requirements of national independence, self-sufficiency, and the development plan and determining the activity of trade within the scope of the trends turning it from an exploitative and greedy intermediary sector, into a basic link of an integrated and developed national economy aimed at serving the people. This requires the procedure along the path of nationalisation of foreign trade and wholesale trade, and the subjection of the import and export policy to the requirements of development and the supreme national interests.

The revolution, while being careful to protect the interests of the toiling masses, ensuring a proper living standard for them, and eliminating all forms of exploitation, greed, and extortion, is careful at the same time to safeguard the interests of the small and middle merchants. It holds the view that the Private Sector in the field of trade can play a positive role if placed in the framework of the masses' interests, and the supreme national interests. The Charter calls for bolstering the Private Sector, providing it with all means of success, development and extension, in order to enable it to perform its tasks in the process of enhancing the national independence, building up a solid economic basis, and affording the goods to the citizens at suitable prices, far removed from

(Continued on page 15)



architects obviously to correct any optical illusion of concavity (which indicates that the Sumerians were at least 1700 years ahead of the Greeks in this respect).

The first storey of the ziggurate is 11 metres high while the second (which is 30 by 26 metres) is 2.65 metres high. No important traces have been left of the third storey.

It was in the neo-Babylonian era that Nebonidus enlarged the ziggurate and raised it to seven stories.

THE ZIGGURATE OF AQARQUF

Aqarquf, which is not far from present-day Baghdad, was the Kassite capital some 3,000 years ago when it was known as Dur-Kuri-Galzu, after its founder Kuri-Galzu.

The Directorate-General of Antiquities has been carrying out excavations there since 1922 and the excavations have shown that the ziggurate had a square base 30 metres long and three staircases, the one in the middle being the biggest.

form of a square. On the eastern side, there stood a platform comprising the royal palace and the ziggurate. The ziggurate, built of bricks, was in many respects different from other Sumerian and Babylonian ziggurates. It did not have the usual two lateral and one middle staircase, and ascent was gained by means of a spiral ramp six feet wide.

MISCELLANEOUS

— BIRTHS BETWEEN

— WORLD'S LARGE

LONDON: More and more British babies are being born between 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. — because hospitals have night time staff shortage. A spokesman for the Royal College of Midwives said that mothers were having

THE NATIONAL ACTION CHARTER

(Continued from page 3)
the price fluctuations and the crisis which are contrived in part by monopolist greed and the anti-popular forces.

E — FINANCIAL POLICY

Throughout the previous regimes, the financial policy had been unstable, improvised and unconnected with the masses' interests and their patriotic and nationalist basic issues. In order for the financial policy to carry out its basic role in building the new revolutionary regime, it should rest on the basis of clear-cut and consistent scientific commitment to the basic interests of the masses and their patriotic nationalist causes, and that by directing the budget expenditure towards the affairs of national defence, development, educa-

tion, health, social security and public services. The Charter regards the following principles as the main guidelines of work in this field:

1. Work for a just distribution of the national income; enforcement of an equitable tax system in the interests of the broad masses; reduction of the indirect taxes on productive goods, medicines, and basic consumer articles; enforcement of a price policy in keeping with the nature of the produced or imported goods and their importance for the national economy, population consumption and needs of economic development; and the enforcement of a customs policy in keeping with the needs of development and the improvement of the trade balance.

2. Distribution of the national income between accumulation and consumption, in the direction of serving and developing the fields contributing to the development of the productive sectors in the national economy.

3. Linking up the ordinary budget with the investment budget, in a manner helping to accomplish the economic development plans and contributing to the delivery of the various state services to the broadest masses with the least expenses.

4. Generalization of insurance education in the building of society, promotion of social saving, and the maximum utilisation of the accumulated reserve material resources in the interest of the process of social development.

5. Enforcement of the principle of economic financial control over the state expenditure and revenues apart from financial control.

(TO BE CONTINUED)

G. Burton, Esq.-.



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Baghdad Observer 28/8/73

5

A deterring measure against armed elements in north

REPEATED ACTS OF SABOTAGE IN SINJAR

The recent measures taken by the authorities in the Sinjar area were in reply to wide-spread and repeated acts of sabotage carried out by armed elements of the Kurdish movement, AL-THAWRA daily of Baghdad learned from an official source.

It will be recalled that the Peace Committee and the officials concerned had on several occasions called the attention of the Kurdistan Democratic Party to the danger which such acts posed to the lives of countrymen and to peace and stability in that area as well as to the contradiction they involve to the spirit of the March Manifesto and the requirements of the prevalence of peace in the area. When the Kurdistan Democratic Party took no steps to deter its elements from committing such acts of sabotage, the authorities concerned found themselves compelled to take the kind of measures necessary to preserve the security of the countrymen and protect their lives and properties.

The source went on to say that the authorities concerned are not going to sit back with folded arms towards the acts of sabotage and of terrorising countrymen and endangering their lives and properties and that they will rather find themselves compelled to deter such acts if the quarters immediately concerned failed to do so.

In respect to the so-called "Arabisation" attempts in the above-mentioned area, the spokesman said: "Talk about this matter is pointless and unrealistic. It will be remembered that under the March Manifesto, the 1957 census provides the foundation for determining the nationalist character of each area. Accordingly, any demographic changes that might occur in any area are of no consequence in determining the nationalist character of the area. Talk of "Arabisation" is thus none but a mere pretext without any real value".

ya village and took the sheep to Tel-Bahlok village.

3—On February 7 a gang of saboteurs led by one Qassim Shisho attacked Betuniya village. The villagers engaged the attackers and later chased them to Yousifan village. A military force was sent to break the fight and the attackers then withdrew to Sinjar mountain.

4 — On March 12, a group of armed men attacked Malak village and were engaged by the villagers for about 24 hours. Two of the villagers were killed and others injured. A military force arrived at the scene to put an end to the shooting. This force withdrew on March 15 after discharging its peace-keeping mission.

5 — On March 13, the gang of Khadida Bassi and Qassim Shasho laid siege to Sheikh Mirza Police Post and to two neighbouring villages. The following day a military force moved out to end the siege and restore peace and order. On its arrival, however, the force came under fire by the attackers. The fire was returned and the attackers were compelled to withdraw and called off the siege.

6 — On April 19, armed men attacked Al-Tapa village opening fire from every direction. When a police force arrived, it came under fire by the armed men. The clash ended only when a military force intervened and compelled the attackers to withdraw.

7 — On April 20, armed men attacked herdsmen of Bitaniya village while the latter were tending their sheep. The clash ended only when a police force arrived. The attackers then pulled back to Tairaq village. While the police force was returning

11 — On June 1, armed men abducted citizens Ibrahim Ismaiel Mohammed (driver), Mohammed Salim Abdullah (Tailor) and Mohammed Taher Mullah Essa (tailor and member of the Arab Baath Socialist Party). The three citizens were kidnapped on the highway while travelling to Mosul. They were led to the headquarters of the local committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Tel-Abu Dhahir where the third was later sent to Galala on charges of membership in the Arab Baath Socialist Party. On June 11, he was released on an ID. 500/- bale.

12 — On July 15, an anti-tank mine exploded under the car of a contractor constructing government buildings in Sinjar. The car was extensively damaged and three workers were injured, one of them seriously. It was later established that the mine had been planted by armed men of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

13 — On July 19, armed men led by Corporal Slaiman Bawa and Wais Banni arrived in Sinjar to organise assassination and sabotage squads from among their elements. They brought along with them hand grenades and light weapons for distribution among persons designed to carry out such acts.

14 — At the same time, the local committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Sinjar issued an order to Party elements in the neighbouring villages to join the armed men in Sinjar mountain after having received weapons from the headquarters of the committee. The men were intended to carry out acts of sabotage and of high-way robbery and attack peaceful villages. A gang of armed men, led by Corporal Slaiman Bawa and Sheikh Khalaf, the Party official in the area, did attack Wesmi Histar village soon afterwards. As a result of repeated acts of aggression, many villagers of Shalina and Kenjo Sherin abandoned their homes.

15 — In the morning of July 22, armed men, including

injuring villager Matto Khalaf Murad. Another mine was found, and later defused, on the road leading to Kabbal village. It was established that both mines had been laid by armed men of the Kurdistan Democratic Party on orders from Corporal Slaiman Bawa.

19 — On August 12, armed men opened fire on units of the Nineveh Reserve Battalion operating inside the Sinjar area. The fire was returned.

20 — On August 19, armed men in Sinjar received a reinforcement of 150 armed men at the request of Asad Khoshoi.

21 — The local committees of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Mosul and the Party's armed men in Sinjar and Tel-Affar were placed in a state of alert on orders from the first branch of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

As to the list of acts of sabotage committed in Kirkuk, this included the following:

1 — On August 18, a group of armed men from 80 to 100 strong:

a — Committed acts of high-way robbery on the Zakok Taza-Khorman highway.

b — held a large number of civilians and military men.

— robbed two Klashinkov sub-machineguns from a military transport vehicle.

D — SEIZED:

1 — Military transport vehicle on which fire had been opened.

2 — A civilian bus bearing the plate number 15412 Baghdad, driven by Latif Mohammed Naje.

3 — A civilian lorry bearing the plate number 1366, Baghdad, driven by Abbas Khadeuri, which car the attackers used to travel to Dakok to join their men.

2 — From 250 to 400 armed men later attacked the July 17 and the July 20 villages and

The spokesman observed that

on Manifesto and the requirements of the prevalence of peace in the area. When the Kurdistan Democratic Party took no steps to deter its elements from committing such acts of sabotage, the authorities concerned found themselves compelled to take the kind of measures necessary to preserve the security of the countrymen and protect their lives and properties.

The source went on to say that the authorities concerned are not going to sit back with folded arms towards the acts of sabotage and of terrorising countrymen and endangering their lives and properties and that they will rather find themselves compelled to deter such acts if the quarters immediately concerned failed to do so.

In respect to the so-called "Arabisation" attempts in the above-mentioned area, the spokesman said: "Talk about this matter is pointless and unrealistic. It will be remembered that under the March Manifesto, the 1957 census provides the foundation for determining the nationalist character of each area. Accordingly, any demographic changes that might occur in any area are of no consequence in determining the nationalist character of the area. Talk of "Arabisation" is thus none but a mere pretext without any real value".

The spokesman observed that acts of sabotage and aggression similar to those which occurred in Sinjar had also taken place in Kirkuk on August 18, which confirms that such acts of sabotage follow the same pattern.

Al-Thawra published a list of acts of sabotage carried out by elements of Kurdish movement in the two areas of Sinjar and Kirkuk as from the beginning of February this year. Following is the list of the acts of sabotage that occurred in Sinjar:

1 — On February 1, 1973, armed elements kidnapped citizen Ali Darwish of Al-Tapa village and led him to the Hargan headquarters in the Sinjar mountain.

2 — The same day, twenty armed men made off with 300 sheep belonging to citizen Hussein Rashed Jassim of Sukaini

withdrew to Sinjar mountain.

4 — On March 12, a group of armed men attacked Malak village and were engaged by the villagers for about 24 hours. Two of the villagers were killed and others injured. A military force arrived at the scene to put an end to the shooting. This force withdrew on March 15 after discharging its peace-keeping mission.

5 — On March 13, the gang of Khadida Bassi and Qassim Shasho laid siege to Sheikh Mirza Police Post and to two neighbouring villages. The following day a military force moved out to end the siege and restore peace and order. On its arrival, however, the force came under fire by the attackers. The fire was returned and the attackers were compelled to withdraw and called off the siege.

6 — On April 19, armed men attacked Al-Tapa village opening fire from every direction. When a police force arrived, it came under fire by the armed men. The clash ended only when a military force intervened and compelled the attackers to withdraw.

7 — On April 20, armed men attacked herdsmen of Bitaniya village while the latter were tending their sheep. The clash ended only when a police force arrived. The attackers then pulled back to Tairaq village. While the police force was returning to its base, it came under fire by the armed men.

8 — Towards the middle of May, fifteen armed men arrived in Sinjar from Gahala and delivered to Khadida Bassi a number of rifles, bazooka rockets and Berne ammunition as well as a quantity of cash to be distributed for carrying out acts of sabotage under the command of the following:

- a — Sulaiman Bawa, commonly known as Corporal Saloo.
- b — Ramadan Mohammed.
- c — Qadir Ali.

9 — Towards the middle of May, a group of elements of the Kurdistan Democratic Party moved from Zakho to Sinjar headed by retired Police Corporal Hussein, with the object of carrying out acts of sabotage in Sinjar.

10. — On May 24, an army supply lorry came under fire near Dholi village.

12. 500/- bale.

12 — On July 15, an anti-tank mine exploded under the car of a contractor constructing government buildings in Sinjar. The car was extensively damaged and three workers were injured, one of them seriously. It was later established that the mine had been planted by armed men of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

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15 — In the morning of July 26, armed men encircled Bera village and attacked it with light weapons. The siege was lifted by a military force which returned to its base the same day after completing its mission.

16 — On July 27, armed men attacked a police post in Ismail Beg area near Sinjar using hand grenades R.B.G. explosives and light machineguns. The police force returned the fire. Later, the attackers laid mines in the area. One mine exploded under a villager. Amjo Khadida, killing him instantaneously.

17 — On July 31, a mine exploded on the high-way near Gali Kursi village in the district of Sinjar wounding Khider Jouki of the same village. It was later established that armed men of the Kurdistan Democratic Party had laid the mine.

18 — On August 1, a road-mine exploded near Bethuniya

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3 — A civilian lorry bearing the plate number 1366, Baghdad, driven by Abbas Khadouri, which car the attackers used to travel to Dakok to join their men.

2 — From 350 to 400 armed men later attacked the July 17 and the July 30 villages and the neighbouring goat-hair tents nearby and set dwellings on fire. In their attack, they used light weapons and R.B.G. explosives. As a result, 8 villagers were killed and 12 others injured.

3 — The same day, armed men opened fire on a military convoy comprising an ambulance, diesel-oil tanker and a gasoline tanker with a wireless set. Intense fire was opened on the convoy.

The attack resulted in:

a — the wounding of five men of the convoy,

b — the seizure by the armed men of the gasoline tanker and the wireless set,

c — the robbing of three sub-machineguns, an R.B.G. thrower and a Klashnikov sub-machinegun.

The armed men later made off for Qadir Karam sub-district.

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THE NATIONAL CHARTER


3. SOCIAL AIMS

Throughout the centuries of foreign domination, class oppression and the rule of corrupt and dictatorial groups, abnormal conditions and grave diseases had prevailed in our society, which crippled the capacity of the masses for work, production and creation, and oppressed them with the chains of injustice and backwardness. The slogan of the elimination of poverty, ignorance and disease, was among the basic slogans in our struggle along the regional and national fields. This slogan still occupies its basic position among the aims of the revolution which aspires to effect a radical and universal change in social affairs, within the scope of a unitarist, socialist, democratic outlook.

The starting-point in the change aimed at by this Charter, is deep faith in the masses and their creative role in making history and building human civilisation. Thus, the revolution, under the joint national activity for building the new revolutionary society, strives to ensure all the required social conditions for safeguarding the freedom and dignity of the citizens, enabling them to work, produce and create, and liberating them from all the chains crippling their powers and human interests. The tasks of the revolution in this field may be summed up as follows:

5— Dissemination of education in all its branches among all citizens, linking it up in a planned manner with the aims of development and with the patriotic and nationalist issues, and basing it on foundations ensuring the moulding of the generation in keeping with the requirements of the aims of the revolution and the aspirations of the people's masses, within the scope of the unitarist, socialist, democratic relationships and values.

avement, exploitation and backwardness undergone by our people, have suffered in addition, specific bad conditions which humiliated their human dignity and crippled their free conscious, creative contribution to human life. Thus, special care for women for transferring them into new conditions, is a basic objective of the process of social change. The liberation of women from the leftovers of the feudalist and bourgeois outlook and from the conditions and chains under which they were treated as mere property or second-rate citizens, is a sacred patriotic and nationalist duty, which sh-



1— () ing labour as the right and duty of every able citizen; and elimination of unemployment in its various forms through development of the various sectors of national economy as part of the objective aims of development; and also through elaborating and enforcing a training and employment system in keeping with the various levels of development.

2— Ensurance of social security and a dignified life for the citizens as part of a plan in keeping with the development of the revolution and the state resources.

3— Achievement of a better coordination between the wage standards and individual incomes on one hand, and the price movement and living costs on the other in a manner ensuring a better life for the citizens, and adequate incomes for the families to meet their basic living requirements.

4— Ensurance of hygienic care, medicine and protection against diseases, and viewing human life as a basic value which should be preserved by all possible means, as part of a developing scientific plan in keeping with the state resources at each phase.

The state should work for developing the pre-school phase, by means of extending and developing the maternity homes and kindergartens as educational institutions and instruments for alleviating the educational and domestic burdens shouldered by the women. It also faces the task of enforcing its plan of compulsory education, on the level of the primary stage and later the intermediate and secondary stages; and also the elimination of illiteracy, which is one of the basic conditions for effecting a radical change in social conditions in the direction of progress.

6— Ensurance of healthy and proper housing for all citizens in keeping with the phase requirements and the state resources. The state aims at the present phase at fixing rents in keeping with the citizens' incomes and protecting them against greed and extortion. It also aims at promoting the cooperation social institutions working to afford houses for their members. It shoulders a fundamental responsibility for building large housing units throughout the country, equipped with all the requirements of health, communications, culture and security.

7— Women, who had suffered all the conditions of ensl-

could be fought for with utmost faith and enthusiasm.

Our society, facing the tasks of struggle against imperialism, Zionism, reaction and backwardness, and against many dangers to its destiny, should not be deprived of the active role which women can perform, contributing as they do one half of society. Furthermore, the liberation of women from all leftover chains and obstacles, is the right beginning for bringing up a new generation capable of shouldering its patriotic and nationalist responsibilities.

4 — CULTURE, ARTS AND INFORMATION

Culture, arts and information are among the highest achievements of human civilization, and the most powerful and effective means created by man for reflecting his social affairs and his feelings, ambitions and aspirations. Each stage of human development had had its own culture, information and arts, by virtue of the dialectical connection between these branches and the social, economic and political system. Thus, it is natural for the new revolutionary system to have its culture, information and arts, reflecting its principles and affairs, its ambitions and aspirations.

Progressive culture, information and arts arise in the old

society and struggle for self-expression and for occupying positions of influence among the masses.

With the collapse of the old society and the attainment of power by the revolutionary forces, the latter are bound to consolidate their decisive and all-out victory over the culture, arts and information of the old society. The relationship between the culture, information and arts of the old society of revolution, is a dialectical one, with two aspects: FIRST, the free, conscious association with the heritage, coupled with a deep, revolutionist, historical outlook; and SECONDLY, the aspiration to the formation of new information, culture, and arts, fully reflecting the affairs of, needs, sentiments and aspirations of the new society. The present phase requires the following precepts and tasks in the fields of culture, arts and information:

1. The information, culture and arts, of the revolution are those which proceed from the nationalist democratic socialist outlook interacting with and unfolding into human culture

IX

Also, concern for the humanist heritage of the civilisation of the Twin Rivers valley and for the Kurdish national heritage and for the folk characteristics of all nationalities and minorities in the country

4. Preparation of possibilities for building advanced institutions for culture, arts and information, and their continuous development for keeping abreast with the spirit of the

in general, and progressive culture in particular; and which are closely connected with the masses and their interests, issues, sentiments, and aspirations, with due regard for the freedom of choosing the forms and maintaining the elements and maintaining the elements of creation.

2. Resolute and conscious struggle against the ideas, theories, trends and methods promoting denominationalism, chauvinism, racism and regionalism and the spirit of defeat and liberation; and serving the imperialists and their feudal and bourgeois mainstays, and all enemies of the revolution and the Charter principles, together with all their derivatives in each phase; and the purification of the information, culture and artistic institutions of these ideas and the elements adhering to them and propagate them directly or indirectly.

3. Preservation of the Arab heritage, explanation of all its humanist and progressive elements, and taking care of spreading it among the masses and in the world:

(TO BE CONTINUED)

age and its progress; their dissemination on a wide scale among the masses, supplying them with efficient elements loyal to the objectives of the revolution; utilisation of all the national, Arab and world experience in these fields, and securing the requirements of culture and knowledge for the various sectors of the people.

5. Struggle against the negative attitude towards cultural, artistic and social position and the living standard of the wor-

kers in these vanguard fields, and encouragement of youth for joining them.

6. Universities in our age are performing an important and pioneer role in the life of societies, as one of the important means for spreading consciousness and knowledge and preparing scientific cadres in various specialisations. In our country, these institutions have got a special role in keeping abreast with the process of the revolution and supporting it for meeting all the requirements of social change in the interests of the patriotic and national struggle. Accordingly, the Charter upholds the need for bolstering the university institutions and scientific research institutes, in a direction harmonising with the masses' aspirations for spreading up the processes of social and economic change; and this can be done only by purifying these institutions of all right-wing and liberalist trends opposed to the thought of the revolution and the principles of this Charter, and through the reformation of the programmes of university education in a manner ensuring its harmony with the precepts and development plans of the revolution, and the urgent need for developing and extending scientific and technological studies.

5 — ARAB POLICY

The policy in the Arab field is determined by the resolve of the Front to participate fully and effectively in the Arab Liberation Movement aimed at eliminating imperialism in its various forms and combating Zionism and reaction; and for social progress, full liberation, and unity; and the nationalisation of all national and popular energies, and their enlistment in the nationalist and liberation battles. As a means for reflecting this policy and achieving its aims, the Charter lays down the following points:

1. Resolute and all-out struggle, with all means, against imperialism and its influence, interests and mainstays, and liberation of all parts of the Arab land from it; and sharp opposition to the attempts of infiltration into the Arab Homeland, whether directly or indirectly.

2. Resolute opposition to any foreign attempt aimed at usurping, dominating or slicing off any part of the Arab Homeland, and struggle in particular for protecting the Arab Gulf from the plots of settler invasion and other attempts, and liberating its usurped parts.

3. Struggle with all means for attaining universal Arab unity on a liberatory and people's democratic basis, where the masses would be the effective instrument in moulding the process of historical unity.

4. Struggle against Zionism as an aggressive racist movement, and settler, expansionist, aggressive, racist regime, and a fascist reactionary ideology; work for enabling the struggle of Palestinian Arab people to return home; and determine their destiny on their liberated land; and condemna-

tion of all settlements and projects aimed at liquidating the Palestine cause and its liquidation by partial solutions.

5. Bolstering the Palestinian resistance with all means, and offering it the required help for enabling it to achieve the unity of its detachments, and its presence and freedom of action for the aims of the Palestinian Arab people.

6. Achievement of unity of joint work among all revolutionary and progressive patriotic forces and detachments, both on the official and popular levels, in the Arab Homeland and inside each country, for the sake of preparing the biggest and most effective resources in the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

7. Bolstering the revolutionary changes in the Arab countries, and supporting the liberation and progressive patriotic movements in a manner promoting the aims of Arab struggle and deepening its historical march.

8. Enhancement of militant solidarity with the Arab people in Oman and the Gulf countries, and everywhere where the struggle for liberation is flaring up. The struggle for these aims is a basic cause organically linked up with the struggle against imperialism, and for liberation and unity.

The unity of action of the Arab countries, and the mobilisation of their efforts and energies in the struggle against the aggressive intrigues and schemes of imperialism, Zionism and the reactionary forces, and their closer cooperation with the socialist countries, are among the major conditions for successful struggle against the Israeli-imperialist aggression. This great nationalist task requires the mobilisation of the Arab masses in effective militant forms, and particularly armed struggle on the popular and official levels, whether on the Palestinian front or wherever need may be, in any usurped part of the Arab Homeland.

6. FOREIGN POLICY

The foreign policy followed by the Front, proceeds from faith in the resolute and all-out struggle, with all means, against imperialism, Zionism and reaction; and from the interests of the struggle for enhancing our national indepen-

dence and defending our nationalist causes, and supporting the cause of freedom and peace throughout the world.

The Front holds that the revolutionary movement in Iraq is a vital and active part of the world anti-imperialist revolutionary movement. It also stresses the full and resolute alignment of Iraq with the camp of the peoples fighting against imperialism, aggression and racial discrimination; support for the world liberation movements and progressive forces everywhere; and furtherance of the relations of cooperation and alliance, with them, and with the socialist countries.

The Front will work for continuing and enhancing the revolutionary line charted out by the patriotic regime in consolidating and developing cooperation and alliance with the Soviet Union in keeping with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation concluded between the two countries; in extending the political, economic and cultural relations with the other socialist countries; and in supporting the forces fighting for freedom and progress throughout the world. Proceeding from all this, the Charter stresses the following points in the field of foreign policy:

1. Firm adherence to the policy of struggle against imperialism throughout the world, rejection of all forms of dependence, supporting the right of self-determination for nations and peoples, and condemnation of the policies of aggression, usurpation and racial discrimination.

2. Opposition of aggressive military alliances, plans and blocs, and of the imperialist policies endangering the security and safety of the peoples and jeopardising world peace.

3. Enhancement of relations with the states and peoples of the socialist camp, in a manner ensuring their mutual interests and tipping the balances in favour of the world struggle for defeating imperialism and eliminating its influence.

4. Enhancement and development of relations with the patriotic and nationalist liberation movements particularly in the continents of Asia, Africa and

Latin America, and with all liberation movements throughout the world in general, including the progressive workers' and popular movements in Europe and the United States; and enhancement of the role of the Iraqi region in the struggle for achieving the unity of the anti-imperialist forces.

5. Building up relations of friendship and cooperation with all states taking a positive attitude towards our patriotic and nationalist issues and interests.

school graduates, allowing the nurse to combine work and study until she gets the highest scientific degree. This decision has given me the opportunity to continue my evening study and get B.A. in Nursing. while I am a graduate of the nursing School for 1954.

A PRAISE

79

With the compliments of

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY
British Interests Section
BAGHDAD

G Burton Esq
Middle East Dept
FCO
King Charles St
London SW1

5 September 1973



80

G. S. Burton Esq.,
Middle East Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
London.

Our reference

3rd October, 1973.

I shall be calling in the next week on all Western colleagues following my return from leave - but you may like to see this now.

4 mns ever

6a

I. McCluney

Cluney

~~let~~

N.B.R 1/2? pse sph

Graham 12/x

RESTRICTED

I called on 20th October, to see Schwartzberg, Dutch Charge to discuss events in Baghdad July/August.

Speaking of the Nadhim Gasr affair he said firmly that Paratroops had disarmed the civilian militia and were responsible for restoring full Government authority at that time. The Army were still under direct control of the President and in a sense Saddams position was less strong thereby. During the summer, the Governments control had weakend a little and the proposals for a new constitution, the National formation, and proposals for Kurdish autonomy had all met with criticism.

2. Kurdish Autonomy: the 11 March 1973 deadline still stands. Meanwhile:

- (i) the Baath have been trying to undermine the position of KDP and Barzani, by supporting a new Kurdish Party who are in favour of the national front.
- (ii) Both Baath and KDP have rejected each others proposals for autonomy of Kurds. It seems most likely that Kurds will continue to reject Baath offers - their position is strong, in that they already control certain areas of Iraq. Kurdish attacks in Kirkuk, Sinjam and Sulaimaniya areas are natural results of continued friction with Baath/Army forces and are not part of a specific campaign.
- (iii) Acriminious KDP/Baath discussions continue to be published in the newspapers.

3. Eastern Bloc: 3 cultural centres remain closed. 30 students have returned from Moscow following Soviet suggestions that they should study an extra year. There is a relative cooling of relations, though Iraqis remain firmly linked in Soviet Treaty of friendship. There is a growing realisation that Soviets cannot deliver the goods in projects and move to the west for important projects viz:

- (i) IBRD - Cold storage and Grain silos
- (ii) IBRD - Lower Kalis Irrigation work US \$ 40m
- (iii) Brown & Root USA Deep Sea Oil Terminal
- (iv) Entrepouse of France - expansion of Syrian Pipeline capacity.
- (v) ? Americans - Rumaila/Haditha pipeline
- (vi) French Survey - Turkish pipeline to Eastern Med.

4. Syria: Some cooling of relations. Speculation that Syrian Baath are trying to influence the Iraqi wing of the party. Syrians remain concerned at Iraqa intention to build alternative exists for oil. Syrian border was closed during 28 September curfew.

5. Baghdad Crime: The fear which has gripped Baghdad and led to imposition of curfew on 28 September could be due to:

- (i) normal criminal activity
- (ii) internal party split - ramifications of June coup attempt.
- (iii) internal group from discontented Army.
- (iv) external harrassment from a) Iranians
b) Syrian Baath.

6. Foreign Relations: Abdul Bakis speech at U.N. He accused Iran of aggressive intentions on the evidence of armed forces expansion. This was a predictable line used often before.

7. Iraq Economic: The picture here is of a strong country, playing an active and powerful role in OPEC, and investing within the country in projects designed to secure long term benefits in oil and agriculture.

8. Summary: overall the Government is weaker than it appeared in June as evidenced by:

- (i) Nadhim Gazr affair
- (ii) the unsuccessful attempts to appease and please Kurds and progressives and internal party factors including Army.
- (iii) their failure to abate fear caused by murders in Baghdad.
- (iv) lack of successor to Gen. Shihab.
- (v) an inefficiency in the Government machine which has been admitted to Diplomats by MFA officials.

I. McCluney

5th October, 1973.

Restricted

(81)

ROYAL SWEDISH EMBASSY

British Interests Section
BAGHDAD



G. S. Burton Esq.,
Middle East Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
London.

Your reference

Our reference 1/3

Date 3rd October, 1973.

Dear Graham,

BAGHDAD CURFEW - 28 SEPTEMBER.

See following (75) (78)
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pa

I have reported by telegram the imposition of the curfew and the official reasons given for it. I enclose a cutting from the Baghdad Observer giving the text of Government views and statements.

2. We first heard of the curfew at 6.30 a.m. and immediately informed our consular wardens. Barry Seddon, our Arabist, and I spent the day in the office monitoring TV and radio (including BBC), and D.W.S. and security officers worked shifts through till 7 a.m. 29 September. We were in contact by telephone with British Community and some other Embassies.

3. When the police and party officials began to carry out searches, staff were advised to co-operate but in fact they did not wish to enter the houses of U.K. based staff. The houses of Pawson and Petheram (B.P.C.) were searched thoroughly, as was that of Hamer (British Council). I understand that the police did not cause offence, and I do not propose to complain about these searches.

4. As one of the unspoken reasons for a curfew could be troop movements through the town, we have to be on the alert for reports of this kind. We have heard that from 2 a.m. to 4 a.m. 28 September tanks were moved across the river from East to West, possibly en route for the Railway station from Rasheed Camp. It is said that some 200 new Russian tanks have been put into service in Rasheed Camp in the last few months. This move could have been their distribution to units. Another report suggests that there had been on the night of 27/28 September some partial military mutiny at Habbanyia, and this was both the reason for the curfew, and for the movement of tanks.

5. During the curfew a fairly complete census was held throughout Baghdad; nearly every household was called on by police or party officials, and all completed a form stating the names of the residents, their religion etc, and also special questions like:

- (a) Do you have any unlicensed weapons in the house?
- (b) Do you know anything of the recent murders in the city?
- (c) Have you ever been interned?

No doubt some weapons were found, and perhaps some people arrested, but as yet there has been no announcement of the results of the curfew and search. It is likely that if the government had caught criminals worthy of their draconian measures, some announcement would have been made by now.

/Continued.....

Restricted

2. *Restricted*

3rd October, 1973.

6. Foreign speculation about the real reason for the curfew reached its height towards the end of the day with a BBC piece suggesting a right wing coup might have taken place. We certainly felt in Baghdad that this was wide off the mark, and some British residents here have said they found it embarrassing. My own view that the object of curfew was to re-establish the confidence of the people in the Government's control of the situation is generally accepted here.

7. The amazing thing about the whole day was the ease with which it was possible to impose a complete curfew, and the meek acceptance by the ordinary citizen of this restriction of freedom.

Yours ever

lan

I. McCluney

Restricted

CURFEW TO CHECK SUSPECTS

SECURITY UNITS FORMED THROUGHOUT BAGHDAD

A curfew was imposed yesterday morning in Baghdad and its suburbs as from 6:00 a.m. until further notice.

Announcing this in a statement broadcast over Baghdad TV in the early hours of yesterday, the Ministry of Interior said that this measure was taken to carry out some security measures in connection with the recent crimes which were committed in Baghdad city.

The statement added that special committees were formed to execute the official duties given to them to achieve the purpose required by the instructions given.

The statement called upon all citizens to cooperate and assist those committees which are performing an honourable and patriotic duty.

Moreover, the statement called upon the citizens to be watchful of any unordinary movement by suspicious elements in their attempt to get rid of some of the tools or crime evidences or hide same.

The statement which was issued by General Saadoun Ghaidan, Minister of Interior, warned violators of severest punishment as stipulated in the enforced rules and regulations and asked the citizens to immediately contact the committees and the authorities concerned of suspicious elements movements.

In another statement, the Ministry called upon night-duty doctors in hospitals and pharmacies and some vital establishments to attend their work and said that Najda (Flying Squad) will transport them upon their contact. The statement also called upon bakeries to work as usual to ensure citizens' needs.

INTERVIEWS - REPORTS

On the other hand, an official spokesman of the Ministry of Interior declared that the decision of the Ministry of Interior had come after the approval of the Higher Authorities of the Government of the security measures concerned to ensure the security of Baghdad in connection with the three mysterious crimes recently committed in three districts of the city.

Earlier, a spokesman of the Ministry had announced that the responsible quarters are exerting extensive and extraordinary efforts to uncover the criminals who, according to the preliminary investigation in the three crimes, belong to a single clique and that the security quarters concerned have taken all the necessary preventive measures to encircle this savage crime. The source added that the quarters concerned have details of the subject until the completion of the investigations.

The source said that the security measures include only the suspension of departing flights from Baghdad Airport and not the arriving ones and the routine flights between the country's governorates.

/criminals ->

Baghdad Observer

Saturday 29 September 1973

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CRIMINALS WILL NOT ESCAPE PUNISHMENT

It is worth mentioning that Sd. Saddam Huggin, Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, had pointed out last week that the recent crimes were not committed by sadists as some may think so, but committed by treacherous agents who have sold themselves to the foreigner. Sd Hussein stressed that the criminals will not escape punishment and they will be uncovered and receive the severest punishment.

FULL RESPONSE

The Baghdad Observer reporter visited yesterday some districts and acquainted himself with the situation following the imposition of the curfew. He had the following report:

The inhabitants of the capital strictly adhered to the announcement of the Ministry of the Interior and exercised full vigilance and order to enable the roving security units perform their duties by checking the residential areas calling on each house separately, looking for suspicious elements and assuring the citizens at the same time of their cooperation and care for their safety and comfort.

Residents of every house were scrutinized. This was done by dividing the districts sector-wise where the security units conducted their check-out in a smooth manner; Police patrols were moving in the streets meeting citizens' requests

and offering lifts to those who were called upon by the authorities concerned to resume their work at vital establishments and installations.

I visited the Army Officers district. The units undertaking the task of checking the houses in search for suspects, had been all welcomed by the citizens. Though members of the units seemed hungry and fatigued, they were vivid and enthusiastic enough to carry out their duty. People offered them refreshments, grateful for their difficult undertaking.

The citizens were confident that the authorities concerned were exerting and performing the necessary measures to put an end to the criminal agents who committed barbaric unthinkable crimes in peaceful Baghdad; they were confident that sooner or later those criminals will be brought to justice and given their punishment.

Some citizens told me that they expected the enemies of the Revolution and agents of particular foreign countries would try to obstruct the progressive march of the Revolution following the rise of the long-cherished National Front. Others were of the opinion that the deadly blow the government has dealt to the imperialist monopolies and their stooges would activate their mean and cowardly instincts to cause harm to our pride and progressive gains.

By the evening most of the districts and outskirts of Baghdad were carefully checked.

SECRET

Middle East Dept
F. C. O.
RNAS-17
(82)



RESEARCH STUDY

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

August 30, 1973

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN IRAQ, JUNE 1967-JULY 1973

In recent years Iraq appears to have replaced Syria as the Arab world's most isolated radical regime. Internal disturbances that took place there in late June 1973 were a reminder of the general lack of information available about Iraqi developments. This chronology is an attempt, therefore, to provide at least an overview of what has happened in Iraqi politics since the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, a milestone for examining any facet of the Middle East. A supplementary alphabetical listing of key political figures has been included to help the reader more readily to identify those who have played major roles in recent Baghdad regimes.

INR/Near East and South Asia
Director: Curtis F. Jones *CFJ*
Analyst: MHattenbach *MH*
Ext. 22027
Released by: David E. Mark *DEM*

SECRET

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1981

SECRET

CHRONOLOGY

IRAQ: JUNE 1967-JULY 1973

1967

- June 7** Iraq breaks diplomatic relations with US over alleged US assistance to Israel in six-day war.
- June 15** Iraq boycotts all British, West German, and American goods.
- June 20** Mutual defense pact between Iraq and Jordan concluded; Iraqi force sent to Jordan.
- June 22** All Iraqi balances and deposits in US and British banks withdrawn; Iraqi airspace closed to US, British, and West German aircraft.
- June 30** USSR President Podgorny ends official visit to Iraq, promises to help rebuild Iraqi military strength.
- July 8** Wartime press censorship lifted.
- July 10** President Arif turns over his prime ministerial post to Taher Yahya at Tikriti, retains post of President.
- July 12** Laws restricting Iraqi Jews announced.
- August 4** Iraqi lifts oil embargo to West Europe, but not to US, Britain, or West Germany.
- August 6** Law 97 assigns Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) exclusive rights to expropriated Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) oil rights.
- August 11** IPC protests Law 97.
- August 15** Yugoslav President Tito concludes state visit to Iraq.
- September 6** Six pro-Nasser cabinet members resign but are persuaded to remain in Iraqi Government as ministers.

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- 2 -

November 27 Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani threatens to withdraw Kurds from cabinet by the end of the month unless Kurdish demands for autonomy are met.

December 1 Sabotage at Kirkuk oilfields.

December 3 All privately owned newspapers banned; five official ones continue to publish.

1968

January 6 Six ministers resign over Baghdad University unrest and failure of democratization.

February 7-10 President Arif visits Paris in hopes of getting arms in exchange for oil.

February 17 President Arif makes diplomatic overtures to Britain for reestablishment of relations.

February 26 Top army officers removed from cabinet.

April 2 Soviet Premier Kosygin visits Iraq, discusses economic cooperation.

April 6 France reportedly agrees to sell Mirage jet fighters to Iraq, despite the embargo it imposed on arms to Middle Eastern countries after the June 1967 war.

April 11 Iraq, under Law 97, excludes foreign companies from exploiting Rumaila oilfields.

May 1 Diplomatic relations with Britain resumed.

May 10 Constitution amended to extend "period of transition" to democracy two more years.

May 17 Two Kurdish ministers resign as protest against suppression of al-Taakhi, Kurdish newspaper.

June 4 Draft law establishing Legislative Assembly announced.

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- 3 -

July 18 President Arif and Prime Minister Yahya overthrown in coup d'etat led by Iraqi Ba'th Party; Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr chosen President, Abd al-Razzaq an-Nayif as Prime Minister.

July 30 Nayif ousted, President Bakr also named Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces.

July 31 Two Barzani Kurds named to new cabinet.

August 1 Nayif attempts counter-coup with help of Nasr al-Hani.

August 4 Taha Muhi ad-Din Talabani (anti-Barzani) Kurd appointed Minister of State.

August 10 Ibrahim Feisal al-Anzari appointed Army Chief of Staff.

August 12 Former ministers Nayif and Hani made ambassadors in move to neutralize political opposition.

August 26 Barzani Kurds resign from cabinet.

September 21 Provisional constitution promulgated.

September 24 March 21st declared Kurdish Day, a national holiday.

September 28 Attempted pro-Nasser coup, involving Abd al-Hadi al-Rawi, fails.

November 12 Former Foreign Minister Nasr Hani slain in Baghdad, victim of political murder.

December 10 Ansari coup attempt thwarted.

December 27 Five Army officers, including Ansari, ousted for role in coup; Hammad Shihab al-Tikriti appointed Chief of Staff.

1969

January 27 Fourteen persons, including nine Jews, executed for spying for Israel.

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- 4 -

March 1 Kurds shell IPC installations at Kirkuk.

March 4 Iraqi Government releases 160 from house arrest, including ex-Prime Minister abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz.

March 13 More Kurdish shelling in Kirkuk.

March 17 Iraq sends token force to Syria under the auspices of the Eastern Front Command.

March 20-25 Foreign Minister as-Sheikhly visits USSR.

April 3-14 Defense Minister Hardan abd al-Ghaffor al-Tikriti and Foreign Minister as-Sheikhly visit Persian Gulf states, offer economic and cultural aid.

April 13 Four "Israel/CIA" spies executed.

April 30 Iraq announces recognition of East Germany.

May 27 Defense Minister Hardan Tikriti and military officials visit the USSR.

May 29 Restrictions placed on Iraqi Jews in 1967 lifted.

June 11 Iraqi Government charges three former ministers, including Bazzaz, with spying for Israel and the CIA.

July 8 Bazzaz and Ansari on trial for "political crimes."

July 30 Joint defense agreement with Syria signed.

August Hardan Tikriti goes to Cairo to explain new Iraqi-Syrian defense agreement.

August 25 Fifteen persons, including two Jews, executed as "Israel/CIA spies."

September 8 Three more "Israel/CIA spies" executed.

November 10 Saddam Husayn al-Tikriti appointed Vice President of newly expanded Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

SECRET

November 27 Six persons, including former Interior Minister Muslih, sentenced to death for spying; Bazzaz acquitted, but gets 15-year term for conspiracy.

December 4 Czechs sign agreement with Iraq; oil exchanged for a Czech-built refinery at Basra and other industrial aid.

December 31 Aziz Sharif, Communist Party of Iraq (CPI) official, appointed Minister of State; first Communist to hold cabinet post.

1970

January 21 Iraqi Government announces that Iranian-sponsored coup is squelched.

January 23 Forty-one Iraqis executed for roles in attempted coup.

March 2 Abd al-Razzaq an-Nayif and other ex-government figures condemned to death in absentia for roles in attempted coup.

March 11 Settlement between Iraqi Government and the Kurds announced; Kurds to receive lingual and political semi-autonomy, proportional representation, and vice-presidency in exchange for cessation of hostilities.

March 29 Five Kurdish ministers appointed to new cabinet.

April 3 Hardan Tikriti and Lt. Gen. Salih Mahdi Ammash named RCC Vice Presidents; Hammad Shihab al-Tikriti becomes Interior Minister, Sa'dun Ghaydan al-Ani becomes Defense Minister.

April 10 Four Iraqis murdered in Tehran, had been condemned to death for January coup attempt.

May 1-8 Vice President Ammash visits UAR, Libya, Algeria in hopes of creating a "united oil front."

May 10-13 Vice President Hardan Tikriti and Foreign Minister Sheikhly visit Kuwait in attempt to win allies in Gulf against Iran.

May 28 Decree restricting the importation of foreign newspapers issued.

June 4 Libyan RCC President Qadhafi visits Iraq.

July Eighth Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) Congress held; dissatisfaction with March 11 peace settlement expressed.

July 2 Culture and Information Minister Salah Umar Ali dismissed; duties given to Sheikhy.

July 16 President Bakr proposes new constitution; only Ba'this in RCC, and more Kurdish autonomy suggested.

July 18 President Bakr proposes Arab defense alliance in the Gulf to include Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and 9 Gulf emirates.

July 29 Iraqi Government grants broadcast facilities in Baghdad to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

August 12 Vice President Saddam Husayn ends visit to USSR; Soviets agree to provide technical experts for Iraqi National Oil Company.

September 10 KDP vice presidential choice, Habib Karim, rejected by Iraqi Government.

October 15 Vice President Hardan Tikriti ousted for role in alleged coup attempt.

October 23 Indefinite postponement of census in Kirkuk announced; action designed to avoid decision on Kurdish rights there.

October 24 Iraqi Government lifts state of emergency in effect since 1965.

November 27 President Bakr frees ex-Prime Ministers Taher Yahya and Bazzaz.

December 7 Attempt to kill Idris, son of Kurdish leader Bazzani, fails; plot laid to Interior Minister Ani.

SECRET

- 7 -

December 16 **Law setting up National Assembly promulgated.**

1971

January 3-13 **Vice President Saddam Husayn in USSR for informal visit.**

January 25 **Economic Minister Qadduri and Planning Minister Hashim ousted.**

February 21 **After talks between Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam and Vice President Ammash, Iraq lifts tourist ban on travel to Lebanon.**

February 22 **KDP turns over heavy weapons and broadcast station to Iraqi Government under terms of March 1970 agreement.**

March 30 **Former Vice President Hardan Tikriti murdered in Kuwait.**

June 19 **Iraq revives claim to 20% share in IPC.**

July 5 **Two British diplomats declared persona non grata, charged with spying.**

August 29 **President Bakr reported ill (possibly wounded in murder attempt).**

September 28 **Attempted assassination of Barzani by security police; Vice President Ammash and Foreign Minister Sheikhly ousted.**

October 13 **Ammash appointed Ambassador to the USSR in move to exile him.**

November 15 **President Bakr announces "National Front," including KDP and Communists.**

November 30 **Iran occupies three Persian Gulf islands.**

December 2 **Iraq cuts off relations with Britain and Iran over Iran's seizure of Gulf islands.**

December 15-19 **Soviet Defense Minister Grechko visits Iraq, talks about military aid.**

SECRET

1972

- February 10-17** Saddam Husayn in the USSR, gains aid for Iraqi oil industry.
- February 16** Clandestine "Voice of Liberated Kurdistan" resumes broadcasting after two years' silence.
- March 28** Saddam Husayn returns from talks in Syria on proposed inclusion of Iraq in the Confederation of Arab Republics with Egypt, Syria, and Libya.
- April 19** Fifteen-year Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty signed in Baghdad by President Bakr and Premier Kosygin.
- April 25** RCC ratifies the friendship treaty.
- May 14** Two communist ministers included in new Iraqi cabinet.
- May** Ex-Prime Minister Nayif visits Barzani and brings Iranian monetary aid.
- June 1** Iraq nationalizes Iraqi Petroleum Company.
- June 14** Saddam Husayn visits Paris to negotiate over IPC settlement.
- September 14-19** President Bakr visits the USSR; gets arms in exchange for oil.
- December** Hammad Shihab visits Czechoslovakia to negotiate arms agreement.

1973

- January 19** Syria signs 15-year agreement on transit fees for Iraqi oil.
- February** Ex-Prime Minister Abd al-Razzaq Arif nearly murdered by security police under Director of National Security, Nazim Qazar.
- February 10** Smuggled Iraqi arms seized by Pakistan Government at Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad.

SECRET

- 9 -

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| February 28 | Iraq announces agreement reached with Iraq Petroleum Company. |
| March 20 | Iraq attacks Kuwaiti border posts in boundary dispute. |
| March 21-30 | Saddam Husayn in USSR for unofficial visit. |
| April 6-8 | Foreign Minister abd al-Baqi represents Iraq in border negotiations in Kuwait. |
| June 28 | Former Prime Minister Bazzaz dies. |
| June 30 | Defense Minister Hammad Tikriti assassinated, Interior Minister al-Ani shot. President Bakr escapes murder plot. Coup leader Qazar flees toward Iranian border, is caught, tried, and proclaimed guilty on all counts. Origins of coup unclear, but Saddam Husayn reportedly may have been involved. |
| July 7 | Twenty-three security officers, including Qazar, executed. |
| July 8 | RCC members Abd al-Khaliq as-Samarrai and Muhammad Fadil accused of not reporting their knowledge of coup plot; they are sentenced to death along with twelve others. Samarrai's sentence commuted to life imprisonment. |
| July 11 | National Front announced by President Bakr; KDP, Communists invited to join. |
| July 13 | Constitutional amendments give President powers to appoint ministers, negotiate, condemn to death, or suspend death sentence. |
| July 14 | Saddam Husayn, in overtures to US and Britain, encourages improved relations. |
| July 17 | National Front agreement with Iraqi Communist Party signed. |
| July 26 | President Bakr assumes the duties of Defense Minister. |

SECRET

Supplementary Listing: Key Iraqi Figures 1967-1973

'AMMASH, Salih Mahdi - former Defense Minister; appointed Vice President April 1970, ousted 1971.

al 'ANI, Sa'dun Ghaydan al Qaysi - RCC member; appointed Minister of Interior April 1970; survived assassination attempt, June 1973.

'ARIF, 'Abd al Rahman Muhammad - former Prime Minister, President, overthrown in July 1968.

al BAKR, Ahmad Hasan - President, Prime Minister, Commander-in-Chief since July 1968.

al BAQI, Murtada Sa'id - RCC member, November 1969; appointed Economic Minister June 1971; Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 1971.

BARZANI, Mullah Mustafa - head of the Kurdish Democratic Party.

al BAZZAZ, 'Abd al Rahman - former Prime Minister under 'Arif, died June 1973.

al HANI, Nasir - former Ambassador to US; cabinet minister under 'Arif; assassinated in November 1968.

HASHIM, Jawad - Minister of Planning July 1968 - January 1971; reappointed May 1972.

al NAYIF, 'Abd al Razzaq - former Prime Minister, appointed after Ba'th coup of July 1968.

QADDURI, Fakhri Yasin - former Economic Minister, ousted January 1971.

QAZZAR, Nazim - Director of National Security, executed July 1973 for coup role.

al RAWI, 'Abd al Hadi Muhammad - former brigadier general; Agriculture Minister under Arif; Nasirist.

al SAMIRRA'I, 'Abd al Khaliq - a leader of the civilian wing of the Iraqi Ba'th Party; former RCC member; imprisoned following abortive coup of June 30, 1973.

al SHAYKHLI, 'Abd al Karim 'Abd al Sattar - UN Representative; Minister of Foreign Affairs and member of RCC until January 1972.

al TIKRITI, Hammad Shihab - RCC member since 1968; Chief of Armed Forces General Staff; Commander of the Army; appointed Minister of Defense April 1970; assassinated June 1973.


SECRET

al TIKRITI, Hardan 'Abd al Ghaffar - Minister of the Interior; appointed Vice President April 1970, ousted October 1970; murdered March 1971.

al TIKRITI, Saddam Husayn 'Abd al Majid - deputy secretary general of Ba'th, vice president of the RCC; number-two man in government, but the top regime strongman.

al TIKRITI, Tahir Yahya - Prime Minister under Arif, July 1967 - July 1968.

SECRET



Mr Burton

IRAQ

1. A few points of interest on Iraq emerged at last week's meeting of NATO Middle East experts.
2. The Italian representative told us that Saddam Hussain had proposed that he should visit Rome next spring. When conveying this proposal, the Iraqi Ambassador in Rome had commented that Iraq's relations with all her neighbours except Turkey were very bad.
3. The Canadian representative told us that the Iraqi Ambassador to Canada who is a Kurd and was formerly secretary to Mulla Mustafa Barzani, has been recalled to Iraq to serve in the Government. The Ambassador had told the Canadians that he was most reluctant to return (and had already successfully refused a summons twice) since it was a thankless task attempting to represent Kurdish interests in any Iraqi Government.
4. The Turkish representative told us that although the Russians had allowed the Iraqis to open two consulates in the Soviet Union, including Baku, the Iraqis had recently refused a Soviet request to open a Soviet consulate in Kirkuk. The Turks assumed that this refusal is primarily related to worries about Soviet meddling in Kurdistan but that there may also be an element of resentment at alleged Soviet insistence on hard currency payments for spare parts for military equipment supplied to Iraq.
5. I do not know how reliable the Turkish story is, but I am copying this minute to IRD in case it is of interest to them.

18/10
ga

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

10 October 1973

cc: Mr Berry (IRD)

13/10
ga

Mr Hunt Ref 12/10
Mr Wright

The second sentence of para 4 above.

2. I agree that the Iraqis, with history
to support them, may well be wary of
Soviet intentions in the North but I find
the 'hard currency' theory less tenable. The
alternatives to hard currency are (a) Iraqi
dinars and (b) bartered oil. I do not believe
even the Iraqis would expect the Soviets
to accept all payments in dinars and with
the rising value of oil there is ample
evidence that Iraq is not prepared to enter
any more barter deals based on that
community.

WJH
12/10

WJH

10 October 1973

cc: Mr. Berry (IND)

JC/269/73

SECRET

9 Oct 1973

Middle East Dept
FCO



With the compliments of

THE BRITISH EMBASSY
J E Cornish

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| RECEIVED IN |
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| 11 OCT 1973 |
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WASHINGTON, D.C.

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CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 404 OF 16 OCTOBER 1973.

INTERNAL SITUATION - IRAQ.

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| RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 17 OCT 1973 NBR 1/2. |
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I HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES EVACUATION FROM BAGHDAD WOULD BE NECESSARY. MY CONCLUSION IS THAT STAFF AND BRITISH SUBJECTS ARE IN NO DANGER HERE AT THE PRESENT TIME, NOR WILL THEY BE IF THE CONFLICT DEVELOPS ALONG PREDICTABLE LINES. I HAVE SPOKEN TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMUNITY TO THIS EFFECT.

2. IN ABSENCE OF BAG SERVICE MIFT CONTAINS SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE SCENARIOS. ANY COMMENT YOU CAN MAKE WOULD BE WELCOME.

MCCLUNEY

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MR PARSONS

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PRIORITY

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FM BAGHDAD 170600Z OCT

*No comment - Mr. Alter
to Mr. McElroy
today
18/10/73
ja*

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 405 OF 17 OCTOBER 1973.

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| RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 | 17 OCT 1973 |
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NBR 1/2

INTERNAL SITUATION - POSSIBLE DEVELOPEMENTS.

1. IRAQ IS INVOLVED IN THE WAR. THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME IS A CEASEFIRE IN WHICH CASE BRITISH SUBJECTS ARE NOT IN DANGER.

2. IF ISRAEL GAINS VERY MUCH THE UPPERHAND OR WINS-(SIC) THEN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR VICTORY MAY REST, IN ARAB EYES WITH USA OR "IMPERIALISTS". WE MIGHT THEN BE THE TARGET FOR PERSONAL UNPLEASANTNESS OR DEMONSTRATIONS THOUGH THIS IS UNLIKELY BECAUSE,

- A) WE HAVE NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
- B) BRITAIN'S POLICY HAS BEEN EVEN HANDED IN SUCH MATTERS AS SUPPLY OF ARMS, ETC. THIS IS POPULAR HERE.
- C) WITH THE US PORTION OF BPC NATIONALISED THEY ARE LESS OF A POLITICAL TARGET.

IN THE EVENT OF DEMONSTRATIONS BRITISH COMMUNITY WOULD LIE LOW FOR A DAY OR TWO IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

3. IF ISRAEL IS DOING BADLY, SHE MAY ABANDON MILITARY TARGETS AND BOMB CITIES LIKE BAGHDAD. IN THAT EVENTUALITY THE RISK TO OUR FEW BRITISH SUBJECTS IS SLIGHT, THOUGH IF AIR RAIDS PERSIST THERE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE SOME WHO WISHED TO LEAVE AND WE WOULD GIVE EVERY ASSISTANCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. WHILE

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4. WHILE THE RISKS ARE SLIGHT, THERE IS ADVANTAGE TO BE GAINED BY BRITISH BUSINESS FROM WORKING AS USUAL. IT IS WELL REMEMBERED HERE WHICH FIRMS LEFT IN 1967.

5. TRAVEL - THOUGH BRITISH SUBJECTS HAVE BEEN ADVISED NOT TO TRAVEL TO THE WAR ZONE, I WOULD NOT INCLUDE IRAQ IN THAT CATEGORY YET. SEASONED VISITORS WITH LEGITIMATE BUSINESS CAN STILL REACH BAGHDAD THROUGH KUWAIT AND ARE WELCOME.

MCCLUNEY

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION:

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

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RESTRICTED

86

R. J. Swedish Embassy
British Interests Section
Baghdad

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| RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 OCT 1973 NBR 1/2 |
|---|

G S Burton Esq.,
Middle East Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
London.

Your reference

Our reference

Date

copied at NBR 3/324/1

16th October, 1973.

For Graham

There has been an interesting leader in Al-Thawra entitled "How Did Iraq Get Into The Battle?".

2. The article deals in some detail with the re-opening of diplomatic relations with Iran, and it is refreshing to find our own thoughts about the internal situation here confirmed in a Government newspaper. If this candour continues the Iraq public may begin to learn again the real meaning of the word truth.

Yours ever
Ian
I McCluney.

c.c. Tehran

c.c. Kuwait

1st
see copy on to
copied 1/20/73
25/10
USG 24/x
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"HOW DID IRAQ GET INTO THE BATTLE?" - AL-THAWRA 11/12 OCTOBER

Begins:

Iraq's participation in the battle is not a national duty as no Iraqi territory is under occupation. But two central facts are important:

Iraq has been, since 1948, fighting against the Zionist enemy.

Secondly, Iraq is now led by a nationalist party, which was the first to conceive of the unity of Arab struggle. Iraq must stand in the front ranks of the battle.

2. Answering the question "How did Iraq give expression to this attitude?" Al-Thawra draws attention to the use of oil as a weapon. Following the nationalisation of IPC 1st June, 1972 Iraq put forward early this year 1973 a plan for the employment of oil as a political weapon if that plan received the consent of Egypt, Syria and the Palestine Resistance Movement. The plan was shelved, but at the beginning of the current war Iraq's revolutionary regime proceeded to nationalise American interests in the Basra Petroleum Company, thus opening a hot political battle against the imperialist enemy. The struggle against America should be conducted by means other than speech making and the issuing of resolutions. What ought to be done by the Arab oil producing countries is to nationalise American share and stop the flow of Arab oil to America as Iraq has already done. The Arab nation rejects in advance the kind of theatrical attitudes assumed in 1956 and 1967 which smacked of hypocrisy and deceit. The masses should compel Governments to submit to the public will if they default in this respect.

3. After Iraq had opened the political front by nationalising the American oil interests it immediately proceeded to contribute to the fighting front, although the outbreak of war had come as a surprise. As soon as Iraq knew of the fighting over the radio Iraqi planes joined the battle on the western front, where they had been stationed for several months. On the morning of the second day of fighting, Iraqi planes were pouring onto the northern front. But the fighting did not stop, and headquarters decided that Iraqi land forces be committed to the battle on a large scale. In facing this decision there were the following problems;

- a. Iraq's relations with Iran had been deteriorating for many years. Iraq was therefore compelled to place a considerable part of its forces along her eastern frontiers. When hostilities broke out on October 6 Iraq sent reserve land forces to the battle front in a token gesture.
- b. Iraq has never harboured aggressive designs towards Iran but the character of Iran's relations with America on the one hand and Iran's policy towards Iraq and the Arab Gulf on the other have stood in the way of peace over the years. All efforts by Iraq to come to terms with Iran have failed including the direct meetings in Geneva in April 1973 between Foreign Ministers of Iraq and Iran. Thus the decision (to renew relations) announced by the RCC on October 7 had one basic and direct motive namely to free Iraq's military power for the nationalist battle. We emphasise that the decision was by no means a

/political

political expediency which could change with a change of circumstances.

- c. It is public knowledge that Iraq is the only one among the confrontation countries to have a serious internal security problem on its lap, namely, the problem arising from the conditions on the northern part of the country. For all the efforts exerted in the way of peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish issue we still cannot, for reasons outside the control of the national forces of both Arabs and Kurds, shut our eyes to this (internal security) problem or underestimate the perils imposed to the national unity of Iraq.
- d. In spite of the considerations raised by these points, a courageous decision was made to commit Iraq's land forces to the battle. To put that decision into effect considerable (logistical) difficulties had to be surmounted. The army had to move across enormous distances. The enemy did try to attack our moving columns in the night of 9/10 October, but the attempt was foiled.

There are many other facts concerning Iraq's participation in the battle which will be disclosed when the proper time arrives.

Ends.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ro. I Swedish Embassy
British Interests Section
Baghdad



G S Burton Esq.,
Middle East Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
London.

Your reference

Our reference

Date 21st October, 1973.

IRAQ'S COMMITMENT TO THE WAR

Copy NEWAD
by Cath. Davies - Cabinet Office
copy to Mr. M. G. M. - 21/10/73
Mr. Hunt
25/10/73

Lowrie and I talked over the Iraqi troop movements a day or two ago. He has a theory that Iraq has committed to the Syrian front only the minimum forces necessary to support its political position as a country in the vanguard of Arab socialist revolution.

2. In support of this he points out that the Iraqi troops which have gone to Syria are not the best; for example the 10th Armoured Division with its T-62 tanks has not been moved. The army leadership are annoyed at having been forced to move into Syria so quickly; they were barely ready. The Syrians are a little touchy about having too many Iraqi troops within their borders, and do not want any more.

3. There is a rumour that Egypt have asked for the Tupolov-22 bombers, and Iraq has refused to send them into the battle. If true, this could be due to lack of trained pilots, or be a condition of supply - it need not necessarily be Iraq's unwillingness.

4. Lowrie has also heard that the Iraqis have some SOYUZ-20 fighters, but we have been unable to trace these in Jane's, and in any case he thinks they are still crated.

5. I find it difficult to believe that a country who has sent three divisions to the battle front is making a minimum commitment! Rather I feel Iraq has sent as many troops as she can afford given her internal situation. As Al Thawra has admitted, Iraq is the only combatant with serious internal problems, and it was only by re-opening relations with Iran that 6 Division could be brought from the Persian border and sent to Syria (and if they had those 700 tank transporters from BLMC how much easier this would have been). The Iraqis cannot send their best equipment as it may yet be needed at home.

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21st October, 1973

6. There is talk about the numbers of combat trained pilots left in Iraq. The Indian Military Attaché suggests they have only 80 here now, but with training easily available in Russia during the last four years at least it seems strange that their numbers are not more than adequate. Still if they had pilots they could presumably send planes to the front and there has been less air activity reported in Syria in the last five days.

7. I hope some of these thoughts may be useful in your analysis of the war as a whole. Though we have a good supply of public statements, and can make some limited use of them, we are very much in the dark about the real position on the ground. Perhaps we shall get some more guidance in the next day or so.

Yours ever

Im.

I. McCluney.

CONFIDENTIAL

Royal Swedish Embassy
British Interests Section
Baghdad



G S Burton Esq.,
Middle East Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
London.

Your reference

Our reference 2/2

Date 29th October, 1973.

Dear Graham,
IRAQ AND THE CEASEFIRE

Enter 14/11
14/11
pa

In an editorial in Al Thawra on 25th October, attention is drawn to the lack of consultation between Iraq and the other combatants both before and after the war.

2. "While Iraq is an independent country, she has brothers with whom there are cardinal and practical commitments Iraq is resolved to set an example in dealing with these commitments even at a time when fidelity is scarce.

3. "Even though we learned of the war through news broadcasts, Iraq proceeded with amazing speed to commit all of its military and economic potential to the battle without let or hindrance, and the expressions we are using are by no means rhetorical. In fact, in order to engage in the battle at the speed required, Iraq resorted to military and political courses which by conventional standards are classed as acts of adventure.

4. "Iraq recognises that the Soviet Union and the United States are between them capable of resolving many of the worlds problems once they genuinely wish to. The Soviet Union, though siding with the Arabs, holds views on certain matters, and particularly on the conflict with the Zionist enemy, which do not fully concur with Iraqs views.

5. "We judged, and judged wrongly, that Iraqs brothers (Arabs) and friends (Russians), having seen us hurl ourselves into the battle (not just sending reinforcements to merit a thankyou), would not expect Iraq to agree without consultation to steps taken to determine the course of the battle.

6. Iraq, having overlooked the fact that it first learned of the battle from news broadcasts but participated never-the-less, is not going to agree to a situation where it learned of the ceasefire only from news broadcasts at a time when its army was locked in battle with the enemy. Let this be known to brothers and friends alike!

7. Clearly the Iraqis feel very sore about this lack of consultation. The editorial tells us first that Iraq did not have prior warning of the battle. It also shows that the Russians and Iraqis do not agree about policy on Israel - presumably this is fundamental disagreement on the existence of Israel and the implementation of Resolution 242. Thirdly the article shows that the Iraqis feel their participation in the battle was strong enough to merit consultation by Egypt and Syria, and also by their friends the Russians, on any ceasefire plan.

*Yas anwar
la*

I. McCluney

Royal Swedish Embassy
British Interests Section
Baghdad



G S Burton Esq.,
 Middle East Department,
 Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
 London.

Your reference

Our reference 2/2

Date 31st October, 1973

Dear Graham,

IRAQ - WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES

RCC and Baath leadership announced 29 October that Iraqi forces are being withdrawn from both fronts following Syrian and Egyptian endorsement of the security council resolution and acceptance of ceasefire.

2. In a long statement the relevant paragraph is:

"We went to the battle with a pan Arab spirit of endurance and self sacrifice, and with the conviction that the battle would be fought to the end. But as we had learned of the outbreak of fighting from news broadcasts, so also we learned in the same way of the ceasefire. Now that the governments of Egypt and Syria have consented to the Security council resolution and the ceasefire - which resolution we had rejected because in our opinion, it does not guarantee the right of our nation to its occupied territories and particularly the right of the Arab people of Palestine to its land - we come to the conclusion that the task of our armed forces sent to the Northern and Western fronts has come to a halt. In neither front does there still exist any nationalist combat duty for our forces to discharge. Besides, there are the critical and serious military and security problems, which the presence of our forces there is bound to arouse. Accordingly, it has been decided to withdraw our armed forces from both fronts so they could resume discharging their national duty in protecting the independence of the homeland, in building a new revolutionary society and in getting ready to discharge their nationalist duty once more as soon as convenient conditions are assured.

3. One can only guess what the 'serious military and security problems' are, but some doubts have been expressed about the Syrian willingness to allow Iraqi forces to stay in Syria. The Lebanese Ambassador has said that the continued presence of Iraqi troops on the Northern front could have led to minor incidents and breaches of the ceasefire.

31st October, 1973

Withdrawal is said to be taking place slowly. There is no word of casualties and no wounded have returned to public hospitals in Baghdad. It is likely that the Iraqis will let time elapse before the full story of their war emerges here.

Yours ever
Ia.

I. McCluney

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
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TOP COPY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 520 OF 1 DECEMBER. 1973

68

MY TEL NO 323 OF 28 AUGUST.
SAADOUN GHAI DAN.

1. IRAQI MFA HAVE INFORMED ME THAT GENERAL GHAI DAN WISHES TO RETURN TO LONDON TO CONTINUE TREATMENT FOR HIS ARM. HE HAS APPOINTMENT AT HOSPITAL ON 11 DECEMBER. HE HAS ASKED FOR SAME ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS PROTECTION AS BEFORE.
2. GRATEFUL FOR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE VISAS TO GENERAL GHAI DAN AND HIS PARTY, WHO WILL PROBABLY BE SAME AS BEFORE. MAY WE ALSO ASSURE MFA THAT SAME ARRANGEMENTS FOR GENERAL'S SECURITY WILL BE MADE AS IN AUGUST?

DONOVAN

FILES

MED

PUSD

MVD

MR LEGUESNE

MR PARSONS

SIR G ARTHUR

MR THOMSON

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pa

CONFIDENTIAL

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D. IRAN

"Radio Iran Courier" on Joint Tudeh Party-Iraqi Communist Party Communique**"Radio Iran Courier" in Persian 1530 gmt 13 Nov 73****Text of commentary:**

The publication of the joint communique of the Iranian Tudeh Party and the Iraqi Communist Party met with a vast positive reaction from the people and progress-seeking elements of both Iran and Iraq. The communique, which was broadcast twice, was warmly welcomed by the workers and patriots in Iran, while it aroused the worry and rage of the despotic and anti-masses regime of Iran. It is proper that a few explanations be given about the warm welcome on the one hand and the rage on the other.

The joint communique, first of all, is a proof of the further consolidation of internationalist solidarity between the two workers' parties, which are members of the large international workers' and communist movements. The consolidation of proletarian internationalism of the communist and workers' parties is a basic and important element in the strengthening of the struggle against imperialism and reaction, both on an international scale and on a regional scale and in each country. Therefore, the publication of the communique in Iran has naturally been an encouragement to progressive and democratic forces in strengthening national struggles and, as a result, it has made the reactionary Iranian regime worry. In addition, the joint communique shows that the national and patriotic struggles of the Iranian Tudeh Party are increasing, and that the efforts of the police regime of Iran to stop our party's activities are in vain. This impotence is manifested in the form of rage. The churlish insults which the leaders of the Iranian regime and their propaganda network aim at the Iranian Tudeh Party stem from this rage.

The contents of the communique, both as a whole and in each individual point, express the wishes and intentions of the peoples of the two countries and expose imperialism and reaction in the region. In the communique the ruling Iranian regime is described as an anti-democratic and despotic regime - as it is - which should be replaced, through the struggles of the Iranian masses, by a national and democratic regime. In this struggle, according to the communique, the Iranian people enjoy the fraternal solidarity of the Iraqi Communist Party.

A national and democratic regime in Iran will be one which will actively fight against imperialism and towards freedom, democracy and social progress. This regime will base its relations with the Iraqi Republic on neighbourliness and ensuring the interests of both peoples, historical bonds and joint struggles. This is what the people of Iran want, and naturally this causes the rage and worry of a regime which is against the people's wishes and intentions and which acts against them.

In the communique, the Iranian Tudeh Party has expressed its profound solidarity with the Iraqi Communists and its support for all the positive and progressive efforts taking place in our neighbouring country. In the communique, the Iraqi Government's nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company and of the American and Dutch oil company in Basra have been praised. One of the fundamental national and patriotic goals of the Iranian people is the full implementation of the Oil Nationalization Law. Under the best conditions which have been created for the implementation of this law, the Iranian Government has signed a 20-year concession and neo-colonialist

agreement with the plundering Oil Consortium. The nationalization of oil in Iraq, therefore, reveals the anti-national collusion of the Iranian Government with the oil neo-colonialists, encourages the struggles of the masses for the true nationalization of oil and is a thorn in the eye of the agents of the oil companies who have been placed in the Iranian ruling class.

The communique has evaluated the formation of the National Unity Front in Iraq, consisting of the Iraqi Communist Party and the Ba'th Party, as an important historic step and a turning point towards the progress of the Iraqi Republic. Hopes have been expressed that the Democratic Party of Kurdistan in Iraq will also join this front. This important incident in our neighbouring country has greatly worried the police regime of Iran, which has banned the free activity of all the progressive parties in the country, has trampled on all the democratic points in the country's Constitution, and has granted predominance to the ganster SAVAK [i.e. Security and Intelligence] organization since the incident inspires national and democratic forces of Iran in forming a joint front to struggle against the ruling regime.

In the communique Israel has been described as an aggressor and the expansionism of the Zionist Government of Israel has been condemned. This expresses the truth and the opinion of all the progressive people of the whole world, and naturally reflects the opinion of the Iranian people. It also reveals the policy of the Iranian Government in practice, which, because of its unity with American imperialism, has not only refused to show the smallest trace of solidarity with Arab countries, namely in the field of oil which was detrimental to the interests of the nation, but also in its propaganda it has not allowed itself to call Israel an aggressor. All the points which have been mentioned in the communique are such.

The fascist coup in Chile was engineered by internal reaction and American imperialism has been condemned in the communique. The Iranian regime, which is itself an offspring of a similar military coup on 28th Mordad 1332 [19th August 1943], cannot of course agree with this condemnation.


Both the Iranian Tudeh Party and the Iraqi Communist Party, in the joint communique, have expressed their firm resolve to continue the struggle towards the consolidation of international proletarian solidarity of the world workers' and communist movement and against Maoism and other discordant trends. The Iranian Government, on the other hand, has always tried and is trying to spread the seeds of discord among the forces struggling against reaction and imperialism by using different propaganda and police methods. It is natural, therefore, that the regime has been enraged by this point in the communique too.

In summing up, it should be said that the Iranian Government should worry and be enraged as a result of the joint communique of the Iranian Tudeh Party and the Iraqi Communist Party. In this communique the regime sees the expansion of the activities of the anti-imperialist forces of the region and the strengthening of the patriotic and mass struggles.

[Note: Section D was last published in ME/4450.]

Note for the File

General Saadoun G. Khailan



The Iraqi Interests Section had not heard of the Minister ETA when I telephoned this morning. They asked me, nonetheless, to reserve the VIP lounge for 09.15 for FL BA 915 which I have done. Special Branch have been informed of this time and of the General's address whilst in the UK which is

48 Gunnersbury Avenue,

ACTON

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
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Reference

EPH.

Mr Burto

Mr Wright



1 I received a telephone call this afternoon to say that Sa'adoun Ghaidan is coming to the UK on 30 November and will be staying "at the former Iraqi Military Attaché's house in Ealing".

2 No visa application has yet been received.

P. K. Williams

P K Williams
Middle East Department

23 November 1973

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CONFIDENTIAL

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RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
- 4 DEC 1973
NBR 1/2.

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73

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 522 OF 3 DECEMBER /INFO IMMEDIATE VISFO.

SAADOUN GHAIIDAN. 91

FURTHER OUR TEL 520 OF 1 DECEMBER GENERAL GHAIIDAN'S PARTY
COMPRISE TAWZI THAKIR AL-ANI PASSPORT B/002854/4203
KAIS AHMED FILAIH PASSPORT B/002824/4151
WAJAN AJIL ZAHOU PASSPORT A/082071/2321

2. AL - ANI ACCOMPANIED GHAIIDAN LAST TIME.
FILAIH WAS SECURITY GUARD OR INSPECTOR WITH IRAQI AIRWAYS
IN 1971 VISA ISSUED 31.5.71.
MAY BE RELATED TO KUSSAY AHMED FLAIH WHO WAS IN PREVIOUS
PARTY. ZAHOU IS NEW.

3. WE BELIEVE PARTY WISHES TO TRAVEL BY BOAC FLIGHT BA 915
LEAVING 0445 WEDNESDAY 5 DECEMBER.

GRATEFUL URGENT REPLY.

DONOVAN

*NGS/12
pa*

FILES
MED
PUSD
M & VD
MR LE QUESNE
MR PARSONS
SIR G ARTHUR
MR THOMSON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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| RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 - 4 DEC 1973 (NBRI/2) |
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TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 338 OF 3 DECEMBER. 1973

YOUR TELS 520 AND 522: IRAQI MINISTER OF INTERIOR.

1. YOU MAY GRANT ENTRY VISAS ENDORSED HOIMG/68 16/0/1 TO GENERAL GHAI DAN AND HIS PARTY. YOU MAY ALSO ASSURE THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS PROTECTION WILL BE THE SAME AS ON HIS PREVIOUS VISIT. YOU SHOULD, HOWEVER, REPEAT THE CONDITIONS AS SET OUT IN PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 197 OF 13 JULY.

2. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AN INDICATION OF THE LIKELY DURATION OF STAY AND DETAILS OF ANY CHANGES IN HIS TRAVEL PLANS IF AND WHEN THEY OCCUR.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES:

MED
PUSD
MVD
PS
PS/PUS
PS/LORD BALNIEL
MR LE QUESNE
MR PARSONS
SIR G ARTHUR
MR THOMSON

WSS/12
pa

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 70
PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

(95)

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 050540Z

CONFIDENTIAL



TOP SECRET
Home Office informed of
para 2. They did not show patrol
alarm
10

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 528 OF 5 DECEMBER, 1973.

YOUR TEL 338: SAADOUN GHADAN.

I HAVE INFORMED CHIEF OF PROTOCOL THAT THE PARTY MAY TRAVEL BUT MAY NOT TAKE WEAPONS. TRAVEL DETAILS AVAILABLE TOMORROW. VISAS HAVE BEEN ISSUED.

2. MINISTERS OFFICE SAID THAT THE MINISTER WILL TAKE AN UNCONCEALED PERSONAL FIREARM AS HE DID ON HIS LAST VISIT. I WAS NOT AWARE THAT HE CARRIED A WEAPON ON HIS LAST VISIT AND SAID SO

MCCLUNEY

FILES
MED
PUSD
MVD
PRIVATE SECRETARY
PS TO PUS
PS TO LORD BALNIEL
MR LE QUESNE
MR PARSONS
SIR G ARTHUR
MR THOMSON

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 30

CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 100645Z DEC.

UNCLASSIFIED

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 533 OF 10 DECEMBER 1973.

MY TEL 528. — (95)

SAADOUN GHADANS VISIT.

MINISTER OF INTERIOR WILL NOW NOT TRAVEL TO LONDON TILL
20-25 DECEMBER. PRECISE DATES TO FOLLOW.

MCCLUNEY

FILES

MED
PUSD
M & VD
PS
PS/PUS
PS/LORD BALNIEL
MR LE QUESNE
MR PARSONS
SIR G ARTHUR
MR THOMSON



12/12
He is now expected to
come on 8 Jan. ~~from~~ Supt
Lambert has been informed
13/12

Bu for info to Mr Williams
28/12.73

pu 28
XII



With the compliments of
THE COMMERCIAL SECRETARIAT

rb 7/12
pa

**BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD**

Copy under comp's to J. BORTON Esq Middle East Dept FCO.

THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER


Editor-in-Chief
FUAD Y.M. QAZANCHI

Political Daily

AL-JAMAHEER HOUSE FOR

ABSP & CPSU SIGN COOP PLAN

A PLAN FOR PARTY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ARAB BAATH SOCIALIST PARTY AND THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY FOR 1974 WAS SIGNED IN MANSOUR PALACE YESTERDAY NOON.



The plan was signed on behalf of ABSP by Comrade Murtadha Saeed Abdul Baqi, Member of the Regional Leadership of the Party and on behalf of Soviet Communist Party by Comrade Boris Ponomarev, Candidate Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

Present at the signing ceremony were comrades Naeem Haddad, Member of the Regional Leadership of the ABSP and Zuhair al-Qaderi, Member of the Foreign Relations Bureau of the National Leadership of the ABSP and Sd. Shadhel Taqa, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Ministry on the ABSP side. On the Soviet side members of the delegation accompanying comrade Ponomarev were present together with the Soviet Ambassador to Baghdad.

Shortly after signing the plan, Comrade Abdul Baqi and Comrade Ponomarev exchanged speeches. Comrade Abdul Baqi said: "After concluding this important document which is regarded as a great action on the path of friendship

and cooperation between the two countries, and as we are signing this cooperation document between the two parties, we are building our friendship and cooperation on sincere and firm bases. This document is the fruit of your visit to our country and of the efforts made by the two sides for the solidarity of liberation and progress forces in the world".

He added: "The Arab Baath Socialist Party is leading the struggle in this country as well as the struggle in the Arab area. The Party realises the importance of signing such a document for cooperation between the Arab Baath Socialist Party and the Soviet Communist Party. It also recognises the importance of this document for all liberation movements throughout the world".

Comrade Abdul Baqi emphasised the importance of meetings between friends and the path of genuine relations and exchange of viewpoints on the strategical alliance within the context of Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between Iraq and the Soviet Union.

(Continued on page 5)

Comrade Abdul Baqi expressed his pleasure for the frankness which was prevailing in the atmosphere of meetings and talks which he said "served our common cause and consolidated ties of cooperation and friendship for the backing of liberation movements and backing the peoples throughout the world in their struggle for freedom, independence, security and peace."

Meanwhile, Comrade Abdul Baqi extended through Comrade Ponomaryov his greetings to comrades Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin, and Gromyko and to the comrades members of the politburo and the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. Afterwards, Comrade Ponomaryov said in his speech: "Our delegation has signed with great satisfaction this document since it responds to the interests of our two countries, parties and peoples".

He added: "The Soviet Union maintains relations with a large number of countries throughout the world, but party cooperation and contacts between the Soviet Union and these countries are maintained with some of these countries. There lies in importance of principle in the cooperation between the ABSP and the Soviet Communist Party. The stronger the contacts and cooperation get between us on the one hand and between the Baath Socialist Party and the national forces front in your country on the other, the more friendship and cooperation are consolidated".

Comrade Ponomaryov expressed his country's willingness to extend expertise and to study the experiment of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and cooperation between the two countries. He also expressed his pleasure over the success of all revolutionary achievements in Iraq. Comrade Ponomaryov expressed his gratitude for the hospitality extended to him and to the members of his delegation on all levels and said: "The sincere intentions and feelings had characterised the talks for consolidating relations between the two parties, countries and peoples".

In conclusion, Comrade Ponomaryov greeted Comrade Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Secretary General of the Regional Leadership of the ABSP and Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and Comrade Saddam Hussein, Deputy Secretary General of the Regional Leadership of the Party and Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. He also greeted the leaders of the ABSP and said: "We will extend the greetings of your Party and comrades al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein to comrades Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin and all members of the Politburo and

accompanying him after a day visit to Iraq at the invitation of the Arab Baath Socialist Party.

A cordial send-off was extended to Mr. Ponomaryov and the delegation accompanying him. Taking part in the send-off were comrades Murtadha Saeed Abdul Baqi, Member of the Regional Leadership of the ABSP, RCC Member and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Naeem Haddad, Member of the Regional Leadership of the ABSP and Secretary of the Progressive National and Nationalist Front, Aziz Mohammed First Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party, Karim Ahmed, Member of the Politburo of the Iraqi Communist Party, Mukarram al-Talabani, Minister of Irrigation and Member of the Central Committee of Iraqi CP, Amer Abdul-lah, Minister of State and Member of the Central Committee of Iraqi CP, Rahim Ajana, member of the central committee of Iraqi CP and Saï Mohammed Mahmoud Abdul Rahman, Minister of Northern Affairs, Dr. Fakhri Qaddouri, Chairman of the Economic Affairs Bureau of the Revolutionary Command Council, Zuhair al-Qaderi, Member of the Foreign Relations Bureau of the National Leadership of the ABSP, Shadhel Taqa, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Ministry and Abdul Wadood al-Sheikhly, Director-General of Protocols as well as the heads of the socialist diplomatic missions accredited to Baghdad.

A press handout will be issued at 8 p.m. next Monday on the visit. —INA

Last night, Comrade Ponomaryov, in a broadcast over Baghdad TV, said that with outbreak of the July 17 Revolution a new era opened which assured to Iraq new vistas of independent development and social progress. He went on to say that his visit to Iraq bore evidence of the strengthening of relations between the two countries.

Referring to the nationalisation of IPC, he said that this move constituted a major step along the road of building independent economy apart from enhancing the position of the Arab national liberation movement as a whole.

Comrade Ponomaryov went on to say that the creation of the National Front between the Arab Baath Socialist Party and the Iraqi Communist Party represented a major victory to the people of Iraq. All sincere friends of Iraq hoped that the dialogue with the Kurdistan Democratic Party would be capped with success, he said, adding that the stage had been set for a peaceful and democratic settlement of the Kurdish issue on the basis of the March 11 Manifesto.

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SAADOUN GHADAN WILL NOT NOW TRAVEL TILL JANUARY.

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PARIS

Your reference

Our reference

Date 14 December 1973

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS

1 When I was in Baghdad last week, I took the opportunity to thank the French Ambassador, M Cerle, for his efforts on our behalf in May and asked him if he thought that the time had come to make further soundings about the possibility of a resumption of relations between Britain and Iraq. He said that he saw no point in broaching the subject again with the Iraqis until after the current elections which he had heard were due to be completed by 15 December. He anticipated that the result of the elections would be to strengthen Saddam Hussain's position and that he would then be inclined to take a more flexible line towards Western nations in general. M Cerle said that he would be willing to take soundings within the next week or two. Although he did not specify the level of his approach, he intimated that he had easy access to Saddam Hussain and, in the light of his previous remarks, I formed the impression that he intended to raise the matter with Saddam Hussain himself.

2 I should be grateful if you would inform the Quai d'Orsay and seek their confirmation that they would have no objection to this proposal. As before, M Cerle would not, of course, reveal that he was making the approach on our behalf.

R M Hunt
Middle East Department

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Saadoun Ghaidan's Visit To Britain; UK/Iraq Relations; Events In Iraq 1967-1973; Details Of Death Sentences. Political Situation In Iraq. 9 July 1973. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/2091. Newspaper Cutting And Photograph. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107472171/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=56360a08&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.